

**WOMEN'S CONDITIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
UNDER DIFFERENT TYPES OF FAMILY POLICIES
IN WESTERN COUNTRIES:
GENDER INEQUALITIES RE-EXAMINED**

by

Walter Korpi

Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University
e-mail: walter.korpi@sofi.su.se

Tommy Ferrarini

Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University
e-mail: tommy.ferrarini@sofi.su.se

Stefan Englund

Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University
e-mail: stefan.englund@sofi.su.se

*Paper to presented at the ESPAnet conference in Budapest, September 2-4 2010
Do not cite without author permission*

ABSTRACT

What consequences do welfare states have for women's conditions and opportunities: fortification of patriarchy, emancipation via women-friendly policies, or tradeoffs between quantity and quality in women's public sector jobs? To advance from classification of countries to causal analysis, we develop an institutional typology of family policies as intervening variables between driving forces and inequality outcomes with respect to women's capabilities and economic positions. Reflecting political forces and religion, contrary to accepted views of uni-dimensionality, family policies are multi-dimensional, main distinctions favoring traditional families, women's employment, or market reliance. Analyzing broad sets of outcome variables in 18 countries, a main difference between family policies appears not only in the degree to which they bring women into employment but also differences in the extent to which women without tertiary education are included. Taking account of such socio-economic heterogeneity, causal interpretations by sociologists and economists on tradeoffs between quantity and quality reflect mistakes in causal analyses.

What effects have different types of welfare states had on changes in gender inequalities among Western countries over the past half-century? The long social science debate on these issues has seen drastic turns and twists.¹ Early gender analysts often interpreted the welfare state as an extension of patriarchy fortifying the subordination of women to men. Soon, however, perspectives were widened to consider the state not as a monolithic system but as involving complex structures and actors, complexities likely to generate “variation in the effects of social policies on gender” (Orloff 1996, p. 56).² Within such a comparative perspective, some gender scholars argued that welfare states differ in the extent to which they have developed “woman friendly” policies reducing gender inequalities.³ In this perspective, the rise in women’s labor force participation rates since the 1960’s were seen as boding well for decreases in gender inequalities. Influential writings in recent sociological and economic research do however maintain that women’s economic and intrinsic outcomes of labor force participation are crucially influenced by processes and factors bringing them into the labor force, with the main distinction assumed to go between women employed in private or in public sectors of the economy. Analysts thus argue that in countries with well developed “woman friendly” policies there is a tradeoff between quantity and quality in women’s jobs; what is gained by large public sectors in quantity of women’s jobs is lost by the lower quality of these jobs in terms of decreased opportunities for women to attain high wages and influential managerial positions as well as by heightened gender occupational segregation and a dominance of female-typed work. Social science debates on gender inequalities have been vigorous and stimulating; they have moved research frontiers forward so that we can now specify areas needing further work, among them issues related to clarification of the concept of gender inequality, identification of specific family policies of relevance for gender inequalities and of their driving forces, as well as empirical testing of effects of such policies on the bases of improved data.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of family policy institutions for women’s conditions under different types of legislated family policies in Western countries, and to re-examine recent research by sociologists as well as by economists. Conceptualizations of family policies and of gender equality have remained rather unclear, and considerations of the role of religion and of socio-economic class in these contexts have at best been partial. Analysts often refer to “woman-friendly” policies, but such concepts remain diffuse and must be specified to make them fruitful in comparative causal research. Definitions of gender equality in the context of family policies remain problematic. For example, how are we to evaluate, on the one hand, policies enabling mothers with minor children in their roles as homemakers and secondary earners, and, on the other hand, policies supporting mothers to a full and continuous participation in paid work via provisions such as child care and parental leave? We argue that in evaluations and debates on these issues, equality in economic terms can fruitfully be complemented by reference to equality in terms of agency and capabilities. In comparative discussions on gender inequalities, concepts of liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare state regimes are common. While these concepts have been very useful for general orientation in welfare state research, they remain too imprecise to be of much help in analyses to test consequences of family policies. The role of culture in the form of religion

¹ For a review, cf Hobson (2005).

² These works include, *inter alia*, Crompton 2006; England 1997; Koven and Michel 1993; Leira 1992; Lewis 1992, 1993; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996.

³ Important in this context was the work by Hernes (1987).

has only marginally entered social science debates on gender inequalities. We show that in the area of family policies, religion has been of major relevance via cultural scripts contributing to the formation of policies affecting relations between men, women and children. Socio-economic class has primarily been present in the background of empirical analyses of gender inequalities, for example, in recent debates on how family policies affect women's opportunities to reach top wages and powerful positions. We argue that analyses here must consider consequences of family policies over the whole range of socio-economic class structures. Identifying serious problems in earlier interpretations of family policy effects, we improve possibilities for causal analyses through a new multi-dimensional typology of legislated family policies in Western countries, a typology specifying direction as well as intensity of different policy measures. We apply this typology in analyses of policy consequences on a broad set of outcome variables with partially new data; results question earlier interpretations by sociologists as well as by economists.

In Western societies, inequality has traditionally been conceptualized primarily in terms of individuals' achievements with respect to material standards of living, happiness and fulfillment of desires. With such criteria it is difficult to discuss many gender-relevant differences, for example, between women who are homemakers and those gainfully employed. During the past few decades, however, analysts have increasingly attended to inequalities also with respect to human agency, conceiving of inequality in terms of individuals as purposive actors differing with respect to resources and capabilities enabling them to make choices over a more or less broad range of alternative activities.⁴ What has become known as the capabilities approach involves a broad normative framework for the assessment of social arrangements and individual's wellbeing (Sen 1992; Roybeyns 2005).⁵ Here a basic distinction is made between extent of achievement and freedom to achieve. Sen (1992, p.34) defines freedom in terms of "alternative sets of accomplishments that we have the power to achieve."⁶ The reasons for looking at freedom to achieve rather than only at achievements is that freedom to choose is an important component in wellbeing. Freedom is to be distinguished from resources or means that help to achieve freedom, since conversion of resources into achievements is affected by individual and contextual factors. An individual's capabilities represent her freedom to choose between alternative ways of living. In the context of gender-related agency inequality, one key difference goes between being inside or outside the labor force. It can be argued that in comparison with homemakers, women in paid work tend to be able to choose within wider sets of accomplishments and to have better capabilities to direct their own lives.⁷ Supplementary types of agency indicators include differentiation in

⁴ Feminist researchers have illuminated the dark history of long-standing gendered agency inequalities in some Western countries, for example, when in marriage the wife could be incapacitated to dispose of her property, to take employment or to participate in decisions concerning children (O'Connor 1993, 1996; Pateman 1989; Vogel 1991; Lewis 1992).

⁵ On agency inequality in the context of gender see also Nussbaum (2000), Siim (2000), and Korpi (2000).

⁶ An influential forerunner in the Nordic countries was the "Level of Living" approach pioneered by Johansson (1970, 1973), and conceptualizing a citizen's level of living in terms of control over resources enabling her to choose and to direct her own life.

⁷ Since women's choice between paid work and homemaking are influenced also by their values, this distinction can serve as a fruitful base for continued discussions on issues related to the equality/ difference question among gender analysts.

terms of access to managerial and other positions of power. Individual's earnings and income reflect their resources relevant for achievement of freedom.

Uni-dimensional policy variation suggested in terms of more or less of "woman-friendliness" must be replaced by a concern for multi-dimensional and partly contradictory family policies. In questioning assumptions of uni-dimensional family policies, we focus on multi-dimensional effects of legislated policies relevant for gender inequalities with respect to agency and earnings. Forming structures differing among countries in terms of direction as well as intensity, we use family policy institutions as intervening variables mediating between, on the one hand, driving forces including partisan politics, churches, and women's movements and, on the other hand, outcomes in terms of gender inequalities. We find that widely accepted assumptions of uni-dimensional family policies among Western countries are clearly misleading. Specifying the role of culture in the development of family policies, we show that analysts have overlooked the role of religion, in particular the key role of Catholicism in the making of family-relevant policies in Europe. While the main left-right partisan dimension runs through all Western countries, in Continental Europe this dimension it is partly crosscut by confessional parties, parties which together with the Catholic Church have historically pressed for family policies markedly differing from those of secular parties on the left as well as on the right. As long-term outcomes of partisan politics reflecting the relative strength of confessional, left, and secular center-right parties, since the 1960s family policies in Western countries have become multi-dimensional in terms of claim rights embedded in their policy institutions, a multi-dimensionality having major consequences for gender inequalities.

European countries with influential confessional parties have thus promoted legislation of claim rights forming what can be described as traditional-family policies, that is, institutions supporting women in their roles as homemakers and as secondary earners within families. Countries with influential left parties in long-term cabinet positions have instead tended to legislate claim rights facilitating women's full-time participation in the labor force and a more equal distribution of childcare between parents, measures combining into what we refer to as dual-earner policies and dual-carer policies, or for short, earner-carer policies. Generally averse to distributive intrusions into market forces, dominant secular center-right parties have largely refrained from legislating claim rights in any of above two directions and have what we describe as market-oriented family policies. Some of these countries, notably the United States, have instead strived hard to extend women's liberties by abolishing gender discriminatory practices. Partisan involvement has resulted in multi-dimensional family policies with diverse effects on gendered outcomes.

Sociologists as well as economists have analyzed causes of gender inequalities, arguing that earner-carer policies have major tradeoffs; large public sectors increase women's labor force participation but at the cost of reducing their potentials to reach top wages and managerial positions. This quantity-quality tradeoff is assumed to reflect that employment of women in large public sectors involves significant negative selection in terms of work-related values and psycho-social characteristics among women, negativities which are further strengthened by work environments in these sectors. Surprisingly, however, neither sociologists nor economists have provided empirical evidence for such a tradeoff; instead they largely impute this tradeoff to explain what they interpret as negative effects of earner-carer policies, interpretations made on the bases of invalid causal analyses. Thus sociologists have found that in earner-carer countries, comparatively low proportions of employed women tend

to have high wages and managerial positions, findings seen as inhibitive effects of their family policies. Bringing in socio-economic class, we show that different types of family policies have empirically observable consequences not only for proportions of women in employment but also for distributions of socio-economic characteristics among employed women; earner-carer countries tend to bring into employment higher proportions of women with only low and medium levels of education than do countries with market-oriented policies and especially those with traditional-family policies. Such differences among countries in heterogeneity among employed women in terms of socio-economic background and formal education are in turn relevant for differences among them in chances of employed women to achieve high earnings and managerial positions. In their causal interpretations, sociologists have failed to account for policy-related country differences in heterogeneity among employed women. Economists have analyzed gender wage gaps by comparing countries in terms of differences in size of wage gaps between median and top levels of earnings, taking higher wage gaps at the top than at median wage levels as glass ceilings caused by family policies. We show that differences in gender wage gaps between median and top levels are driven by factors making for particularly low wage gaps at median levels of earnings, with forms of wage setting in the key role. These methodological problems in causal analyses clearly invalidate earlier conclusions on tradeoffs.

To clarify arguments in the long debate on women's paid and unpaid work, it is helpful to consider what has been termed the totality of necessary work in a society (Glucksmann 2000). The totality of necessary work includes production of goods and of services but also reproduction involving household maintenance related to food and cleaning as well as what Daly and Lewis (1999) describe as social care related to children and the elderly. Key issues in debates on policies to decrease gender inequality during the past few decades have concerned the extent to which such social care should be promoted as paid work in the public sector, as paid work in the private sector, or as unpaid work in the home; choices here are likely to be of major significance for women's agency inequalities. As noted above, legislated policy packages resulting from these debates are likely to reflect the strength of different societal actors.

In comparative social science research involving a relatively large number of countries, we face serious problems with data availability, a situation necessitating combination of information from many different sources. Problems with data availability become acute in the use of multilevel statistical analyses combining country-level institutional information with individual level data, enabling us to analyze the specific roles of country characteristics and of individual characteristics as well as interactions between these two levels. Such data problems can be more easily handled, for example, in comparative attitude studies which produce comparable information on dependent variables for all countries. Here we need comparable and detailed individual-level data on incomes, earnings, and labor force participation within a single dataset. In this context, the main here relevant dataset is the well-known Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which in spite of its great advantages in some respects also has limitations, one of them being incomplete information in some countries on relevant individual level variables, another that for security reasons data can not be exported from the LIS setting.⁸ It is therefore necessary for us to complement multilevel analyses with those based on country-level information from other sources. We have been very careful in assessing quality and comparability of data brought into our analyses. When possible we use

⁸ Atkinson 2000; <http://www.lisproject.org>

multilevel as well as country level analyses to check reliability of results by “triangulating” results from two partly different points of view.

In the context of analysis based on comparative country-level data, causal interpretations face problems differing from those in dealing with data based on individuals.⁹ When sampling individuals within a country, one can improve validity of interpretations, for example, by taking new or larger samples from the same population. In comparative causal analyses, we study the whole population of unique cases, often a score or so of Western countries. Taking new samples by including countries outside this setting does not necessarily improve prospects for valid causal interpretations; it may add to earlier problems. Here close familiarity with countries in terms of historical and other key aspects is necessary for improving validity of causal interpretations based on quantitative analyses. In causal analyses focused on a specific set of critical variables, it is fruitful to select countries which differ in terms of causal variables of interest but are relatively homogeneous with respect to many factors which potentially can “confound” causal relationships to be tested. This strategy - sometimes known as the selection of most comparable cases – can be seen as an attempt to control for effects of potential confounding factors in causal comparative research (Lijphart 1975; Mair 1996). Our study is based on 18 countries with uninterrupted political democracy after the Second World War and at least one million inhabitants: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

The rest of the article is organized in the following way. We begin by a brief review of earlier research on effects of family policies on differences in gender inequalities among countries. While recent gender research has only partially covered the broad spectrum of family policy models sketched above, it has raised issues related to assumed negative effects of earner-carer policies. Extending our examination of these issues to include effects of different types of family policies, we evaluate arguments and empirical evidence presented by sociologists and economists on differences among countries in terms of gender inequalities and locate serious problems in earlier causal interpretations. We move research frontiers forward into causal analysis by developing empirical indicators for different types of family policies along the three policy dimensions indicated above. This involves identification of specific policy programs in each country granting claim rights likely to affect women’s choice between paid work and homemaking as well as quantification of program rules to enable comparisons among countries.

Empirical examinations of the role of institutional structures of family policies begin with multi-level statistical analyses of a basic distinction in terms of women’s agency, that is, of factors affecting women’s choice between paid work and homemaking. For most of our countries, we have data permitting comparisons of net odds for women in different types of family policy contexts to enter the labor force. Using multilevel statistical analysis, we explore the extent to which different family policy models bring into employment women with tertiary, secondary, and less than secondary formal education. Results indicate significant differences among family policy clusters in labor force participation rates among women without tertiary education, and marked interactions between family policy models and employment rates of women. Turning to women’s economic opportunities net of individual characteristics, we use multilevel analyses to explore chances of women in different family

⁹ For debates on these issues, cf. Ragin (1989) and a seminal article by Shalev (2007) in a symposium on methodology in comparative research (Mjøseth and Clausen 2007).

policy contexts to reach top quintiles in national income distributions. Results show no general differences among family policy models in women's opportunities to reach top wage quintiles, nor marked interactions between policy models and women's top shares. From other data sources we add macro-comparisons between countries, using information on managerial positions and partially new comparative data on the access of women to directorates of major firms. Results indicate relatively small differences in gender managerial gaps, but potentially point to somewhat larger differences with respect to women's participation in corporate boards. As noted above, we question studies by economists on glass ceilings in women's possibilities to reach high earnings, interpretations based on differences in gender wage gaps between median and top wages in a country. We show that in this context differences in forms of wage setting are relevant; involvement by broad-based trade unions and by legal arbitration tends to compress wage dispersion at median and lower levels. When we examine gender wage gaps at top levels of wage distributions, with few exceptions differences among family policy models are small.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

In their landmark study on occupational gender segregation, Charles and Grusky (2004, p.10) pose as one of their central puzzles: "Why are gender-egalitarian countries extremely segregated?" Recent scholarly debates on the role of family policies for gender inequalities have largely focused on earner-carer policies, while less attention has been paid to specific effects of other types of family policies for gender inequalities. As noted above, while acknowledging the relative success of earner-carer policies in bringing women into paid work, in leading sociology journals analysts have argued for a negative public sector tradeoff, where the transfer of social care work to the public sector unintendedly decreases women's commitment to paid work and increases employer statistical discrimination, thereby lowering women's probabilities to reach top earnings and powerful positions. In this context, the frequently used concept of glass ceilings is interpreted to imply that women's difficulties for advancement markedly accelerate at top levels of wage ladders and job hierarchies. In claiming to have discovered a "Welfare State Paradox," sociologists Mandel and Semyonov (2006: p.1917) maintain that "in highly developed welfare states the 'glass ceiling' has become lower and wider [resulting in] low access for women to positions of power, authority, and high economic rewards." They explicitly refrain from considering the possibility of multi-dimensional policies, holding that in general

"state actions do not enhance women's occupational and economic achievements, since none of them seriously challenges the traditional distribution of market-family responsibilities of men and women" (p. 1911).

In a parallel paper, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, pp. 950, 952) claim that by employing women in large public sectors, earner-carer family policies

"are likely to increase rather than to decrease earnings gaps between men and women [since] the nature of these jobs and convenient work conditions available in the public sector do not appear to enhance the economic opportunities of women in terms of occupational positions and earnings. Rather they appear to reinforce women's tendency to compromise on convenient working conditions in the female-typed jobs and to deter them from attaining high-paying positions."

Similar views are expressed by Mandel and Shalev (2009, pp. 1878-79), maintaining that the Scandinavian experience of egalitarian family policies teaches us that

“public care ... contributes to the concentration of women in feminized service jobs, lowering their representation in better-paid male-dominated jobs.”

A serious weakness in the causal conclusions by Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) is that their key independent variable, the “Welfare State Intervention Index,” fails to differentiate between contrary types of family policies, that is, between traditional-family and earner-carer policies outlined above. As noted above, Mandel and Semyonov do not empirically demonstrate that earner-carer countries actually have a negative selection into the labor force in terms of work orientations and psycho-social individual characteristics; they as well as others impute such negative selection to explain statistical findings based on problematic causal analyses. Thus, in examining probabilities for women in different countries to reach top wages, Mandel and Semyonov focus only at country differences among employed women, taking differences among employed women as their basis for causal conclusions about effects of different types of welfare states on chances for women in a country to achieve top wages. Thereby, they disregard differences among family policies in potential to generate heterogeneity among employed women in terms of socio-economic class and education. As noted above and documented in the following, earner-carer countries bring into employment considerably larger proportions of women without tertiary education than do other gender policy models. To evaluate effects of different family policies on probabilities of women in a country to access top wages, we must therefore compare country differences in terms of probabilities of all women to reach top wages, that is, proportions of women in the top quintile in relation to the total number of women in the population. We return to problems of causal interpretation below.

Since countries with earner-carer policies employ major parts of women in the public sector, differences between public and private sectors in wages among men as well as among women are here relevant. Comparing seven countries, Gornick and Jacobs (1998) explored earnings differentials between public and private sector employees around 1990, with a focus on the extent to which public sectors provide high-paying jobs for women.¹⁰ In all countries, earnings compression was higher in the public than in the private sector, and public/private earnings ratios tended to be negatively correlated with public sector size. In Sweden, the only one among them with a with large public sector, private sector employees had higher wages than their equals in the public sector; interpretations of differences between sectors in terms of family policy consequences are however complicated by the finding that wage differences were more pronounced for men than for women. Other studies from Sweden contribute to nuance the effects of the public/private sector divide for earnings of men and women; the choice between working in the public or private sectors is consequential not only for women but also for men. Confirming the above observations, le Grand, Szulkin and Thålin (2001a) thus found that among comparable individuals, wage differences between public and private sectors were greater for men than for women.¹¹

¹⁰ Countries included were Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.

¹¹ Examining gender gaps in attainment of supervisory and managerial positions 1965-1991 in Sweden, Hultin (2001) showed that women were substantially more restricted than men in attaining supervisory positions, especially at lower and intermediate white collar positions in the private sector. Analyzing changes during the postwar period, Korpi and Stern (2004) found higher gender gaps in promotion rates in the 1960s and 70s – decades with major female labor force expansion – than in the preceding 1950s as well as in the following 1990s. The higher gender promotion gaps in the 1960s and 70s may reflect cohort effects generated by the expansion of the public sector employment in these decades

In examining gender wage gaps in the United States and in Sweden, economists Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman (2003) define the glass ceiling in terms of differences among countries in the increase of gender wage gaps from the 50th to the 80th percentile of the total wage distribution. Finding a larger difference in the size of wage gaps between median and top wage levels in Sweden than in the United States, they conclude that glass ceilings exist in Sweden but not in the United States. Glass ceilings in Sweden are seen as resulting primarily from an interaction between negative selection of women into the public sector in terms of work involvement, and tendencies of work environments in this sector to discourage intensive work and career involvement among them. Thus Albrecht et al. (2003, p.172) state:

“Daycare and parental programs give Swedish women a strong incentive to participate in the labor forces. ... At the same time benefits may discourage strong career commitment on part of the parents mostly involved in child rearing. In practice it means that women may have strong incentives to participate in the labor force but not to do so very intensively.”

Using similar indicators based on increases in gender wage gaps from median to top levels, economists have reported glass ceilings from many European countries (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan 2007; Booth 2006). Some economists claim that in Denmark these policies have generated a “welfare state-based glass ceiling” (Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2008, p. 80). As noted above, in this context we must however consider the possibility that separate factors may affect gender wage gaps at median and at top levels of earnings distributions. The relevant comparison here is therefore between size of gender wage gaps at top levels of wage distributions.

DIMENSIONS AND MODELS OF FAMILY POLICY INSTITUTIONS

Most comparative studies on welfare states and inequalities have related their findings to some form of welfare state typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Fraser 1994; Hicks and Kenworthy 2003; Lewis 1992, 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996). As argued above, in analyses of causal processes underlying differences in gender inequalities among countries, it is fruitful to use a multi-dimensional typology based on family policy institutional structures as an intervening variable. Drawing on strengths of previous research, we decompose the welfare state concept by identifying separate models of family policies based on claim rights likely to mediate effects from policy makers in ways resulting in a divergence of gender inequalities between countries.

In this context, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) outline of conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare state regimes has long provided very fruitful landmarks for discussions on welfare states. His regime typology is based on patterns of correlations between three aspects: driving forces, policy institutions, and policy outcomes, correlations seen as forming three types of welfare state regimes. The major strength of this typology is that it reflects key partisan political cleavages found in Western countries in the late 20th century: the general left-right dimension in all Western countries but in Continental Europe partly crosscut by confessional parties. Esping-Andersen identified three clusters of regimes, however with somewhat diffuse boundaries and some countries difficult to classify. This typology has been very valuable in giving general orientations and in suggesting interpretations of observable differences among welfare states. For analyses of causal processes behind differences in gendered outcomes among countries and of changes in outcomes over time, the regime typology is however less helpful because of its static and undifferentiated base mixing causes, institutions and outcomes. An examination of the fit of a country into this regime typology

enables us to attach a label to a country; it is of little help in analyses of causal factors leading to differences among countries in outcomes, nor in analyses of policy changes.

In the sciences, a well-known saying is that if standing on the shoulders of giants, a researcher can see farther. To improve causal analyses in this area, we therefore attempt to climb atop the shoulders of Esping-Andersen by retaining the basic three-fold template reflecting divisions between main types of driving forces, but replacing his attention to regimes with a focus on institutional structures of family policies seen as intervening variables mediating between driving forces and outcomes. Since our institutional typology builds on main driving forces shared by Esping-Andersen's regimes, the two will categorize countries in roughly similar patterns. Our gains include greatly improved insights into how driving forces have differently shaped welfare state institutional structures in ways of direct relevance for outcomes in terms of gender inequalities. It also gives precise descriptions of differences among countries in gender-relevant institutions and enables analyses of change over time, something of crucial relevance in periods when gender relations are re-structured.

When considering a typology of policy institutions relevant for gender equality as an analytic tool for causal analyses, it is fruitful to differentiate between claim rights and liberties, that is, between "freedom to" and "freedom from."¹² Claim rights enable citizens to secure material support from public authorities in terms of cash and services facilitating gender equality; liberties open up possibilities to extend gender equality by removing discriminatory rules and practices. We have not found comprehensive comparative data describing the development of women's liberties. To an extent varying among countries, liberties and claim rights are however likely to have developed in tandem. We focus on claim rights, assuming that they are likely to have a more immediate impact than liberties on women's realized choices. Unpacking policies as defined in existing legislation on social policies and taxation, we identify claim rights broadly seen as woman-friendly into specific policy dimensions potentially differing in their consequences for women's choices between paid and unpaid work. Selecting policy indicators in areas of transfers, services, and tax systems, we combine sets of such indicators into policy dimensions likely to have different consequences for women's choices between paid and unpaid work. By locating countries according to direction as well as intensity of policy measures, we can examine to what extent they differ in ways indicating separate institutional models of family policies. Such a typology is fruitful in attempts to account for long-term causal processes generating differences among countries in observed gender inequalities and for changes in such inequalities over time. An early version of this typology was outlined by Korpi (2000), developing a two-dimensional version of policy indicators. This typology has been elaborated by Ferrarini (2006) and is here extended by a dimension reflecting policies encouraging fathers to care for their minor children. Our typology of family policy institutions can easily identify changes over time in different countries.

As noted above, well after the end of the Second World War, most Western governments largely left it to families and markets to tackle issues related to social care and to women's roles without attempting to shape gender relations by developing public policies granting claim rights to citizens.¹³ Thus Ferrarini (2006) indicates that up to mid-1960s our countries show relatively muted differences in family policies. Beginning in the early 1970s, however,

¹² For a classical discussion on the concept of freedom, cf Berlin (1969).

¹³ In some countries, especially France, for economic and military reasons, policies were developed to increase nativity (Pedersen 1993).

claim-based family policies have developed to form divergent dimensions in claim rights. Policies extending claim rights of relevance for a traditional-family dimension facilitate women's unpaid work within the home and support the nuclear family in various ways but presume that wives have the major responsibility for social care work at home and enter paid work primarily on a temporary basis as secondary earners, the husband remaining the main breadwinner. The dual-earner dimension includes policies attempting to strengthen capabilities of women, particularly of mothers, to a continuous participation in paid work. Such policies encourage and enable women's extensive labor force participation by transferring significant parts of social care from the home to the public sector. In recent years, some countries have introduced policies to redistribute child care within the family by stimulating fathers to take a more active part in the care of their minor children, that is, a dual-carer dimension; these efforts are however still in a nascent stage. As discussed below, the dual-carer and dual-earner dimensions work in synergy and are relatively closely correlated.

Classifying gender-relevant policy indicators found in our countries around 2000 into the above policy dimensions, we arrive at a three-dimensional policy space which enables us not only to put labels on countries but, more importantly, to fruitfully describe policy differences among them in terms of their goals as well as in terms of their strength.¹⁴ Yet we must recall that institutions are always embedded in wider social, cultural and historical contexts of relevance for policy outcomes. Especially important in this context have been norms promoted by churches, in particular the Catholic Church, as well as factors such as economic and labor market policies, attitudes and values among citizens. Gender relevant institutions are resultants of often diverging forces; policy configurations are alloys, not elements. As underlined by Ferrarini (2006), in some countries partisan conflicts have introduced contradictory parts into gender policies (Hiilamo and Kangas 2009; Leira 2006). Comparativists recognize that it is often very difficult to find reliable and valid indicators for relevant aspects of social policy dimensions. In this context, especially the quality of available information on daycare services for pre-school children is problematic. From the point of view of enabling dual-earner families, daycare services should be affordable and cover full days and whole working weeks for all children below school age (Korpi 2000; Rostgaard 2002).

The traditional-family dimension is based on a weighted average of four policy indicators:

1. Child allowances for minor children paid in cash or via the tax system (expressed as a percentage of a single workers' net wage at the level of industrial workers in the country).¹⁵ (Weight 1.0).
2. Part-time public daycare services for somewhat older children (from three years up to school age), relating numbers of places or children in care to children in the relevant age group. (Weight 1.0).
3. Home care allowance to a parent for care of children below school age. (Weight 0.5).¹⁶
4. Marriage subsidies via tax benefits to head of household having an economically non-active spouse. (Weight 0.5).

¹⁴ There are alternative ways of labeling these models. Thus, for example, Lewis and Guillari (2005) have here used the "adult worker" term to describe the dual-earner model. For discussions and analyses of these models cf Fraser (1994), Gornick and Meyers (2003), Crompton (2006), and Kenworthy (2003).

¹⁵ As a baseline for comparisons between countries and over time, we have here used the average wage of industrial workers, the primary relevant category for which comparable and longitudinal data are available.

¹⁶ These programs are sometimes also referred to as child-care leave benefits.

Child allowances are early forms of family support likely to be neutral with respect to labor force participation of spouses. In some countries, including USA, benefits come as tax credits or allowances. Part-time public daycare presumes that mothers are engaged in homemaking or part-time employment. Because of low earnings replacements, the home care allowance tends to be chosen by the parent with the lowest earnings, typically the mother. The marriage subsidy (Montanari 2000) describes differences in the net post-tax earnings between, on the one hand, a single person, and, on the other hand, a two-person household where only one spouse is economically active, this difference expressed as a percentage of the net average wage of a single worker.¹⁷ Weights are introduced to reflect that the two first-named indicators are found in all countries and concern all families, while the latter two indicators are of relevance in fewer countries and for fewer families.¹⁸

The dual-earner dimension is an unweighted average of three policy indicators:

1. Full-time public daycare services for the youngest children (0-2 years of age), relating numbers of places or of children in care to children in the relevant age group.
2. Full-time public daycare services for children over-threes.
3. Earnings-related parental insurance (a multiplicative variable reflecting the percentage of replacement of previous earnings and duration of benefit).¹⁹

This index reflects the extent to which public policies enable a shift of child care work from the family to the public sector in ways enabling mothers to maintain a major and continuous occupational commitment. Provision of full-time and continuous child care for the under-threes as well as for the somewhat older children is here important.²⁰ Central here are also policies for earnings-related parental leave, encouraging young women to start and to maintain an occupational career while enabling parents to have an interlude for the care of infants. To differentiate earnings-related parental leave from homecare allowances with low flat-rate benefits but often long duration, we here use a multiplicative indicator.²¹

As noted above, some countries have introduced programs to stimulate fathers to take a more active part in the care of their minor children, thereby redistributing childcare within the family. With earnings-related benefits, such programs cater also to men and are earmarked for fathers or permit sharing between parents. The dual-carer dimension is an unweighted average of two policy indicators based on earnings-related parental and paternity insurance:

1. Number of weeks of paid leave which can be used either by the mother, the father, or by both.
2. Number of weeks of paid leave reserved for fathers.

Figure 1 indicates positions of different countries within a three-dimensional space formed by the traditional-family, dual-earner, and dual-carer dimensions.²² The horizontal axis

¹⁷ The term “marriage subsidy” alludes to the term “marriage premium” used by economists to refer to the positive wage differences between married and single men. Tax benefits include tax allowances and tax credits and are computed at average industrial worker wage levels. They can also be described as tax penalties for secondary earners.

¹⁸ We have tested different ways of weighting indicators but they do not result in major changes.

¹⁹ Replacement rates refer to a year with one spouse receiving replacement at average production worker net wages while the other is not working.

²⁰ Of relevance here is also the scheduling of hours within primary schools, which may facilitate or hinder parental employment (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997).

²¹ Gornick and Meyers (1999, p. 130) added duration and replacement rates of all types of benefits, thereby to some extent overstating employment supporting effects.

²² Note that than in this and later figures, country names are abbreviated in the two-letter version following internet addresses.

reflects the degree of dual-earner support and the vertical axis the degree of traditional-family support; country positions on each dimension are based on the sum of standardized policy indicators. The third dimension, dual-carer support, is reflected in the relative size of the grey country blots. All indicators are standardized with to an average equal to zero and a standard deviation of unity (cf Methodological Appendix A). As noted above, differences in family policies among our countries were long muted (Ferrarini 2006). Since about 1970, however, driven by partisan politics as well as by women's movements, claim rights have greatly expanded but have moved in two largely different directions, that is, traditional-family policies or earner-carer policies.

(Figure 1 about here)

Up to 2000, these changes in claim rights have generated three relatively clear-cut clusters of countries. With high values on traditional-family support but relatively low values on dual-earner support and very little of dual-carer support, in the upper left corner we find Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands forming a cluster with a traditional-family policy model. Distinguished by the clearly highest values on dual-earner support as well as by relatively well developed dual-carer support, in the lower right corner Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden share what can be described as a dual-earner/dual-carer model, in short an earner-carer model.²³ Dual-carer support has emerged primarily in countries which pioneered the development of dual-earner support; sprinklings of such support are also found in Canada as well as in Belgium and France.²⁴ The dual-earner and dual-carer dimensions are thus clearly correlated, indicating similar driving forces, yet having partly different effects in terms of gender-relevant outcomes. Contrary to the uni-dimensional assumption of Mandel and Semyonov (2006), the scatter plot indicates a clearly negative relationship between earner-carer and traditional-family dimensions.²⁵

In the lower left corner, with relatively low degrees of traditional-family support as well as of earner-carer support, we find a very heterogeneous category with countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, and United States. Their primary common denominator is a reluctance to legislate claim rights associated with traditional-family policies or earner-carer policies, thereby leaving families to reconcile work and child care largely via markets and kin. While we here describe them as having a market-oriented model of gender policy, their heterogeneity in terms of historical and political factors relevant for gender equality must be strongly underlined. Among them it is reasonable to take Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States as something of "prototypical" market-oriented countries in the sense that this outcome is likely to largely reflect active political choices. In these countries women's movements have pressed for extension of women's liberties, that is, abolition of gender-discriminatory rules and practices (O'Connor et al. 1999). In the United States, pressures to extend women's liberties have been intensive and have greatly benefited from the presence of a legal machinery once developed for handling anti-

²³ In the earner-carer countries, traditional-family support reflects relatively generous cash child benefits largely neutral with respect to paid and unpaid work. Contradictory gender policies in Denmark, Finland, and Norway include home care allowances and marriage subsidies.

²⁴ In Canada, after a Supreme Court decision, men were accorded the same 10 week leave as mothers had, while Belgium and France give half a week of paid leave for fathers.

²⁵ Mandel and Semyonov (2006, fn 15) argue that their main independent variable (Welfare State Intervention Index) has a close positive correlation with our dual-earner dimension. Their correlation does however largely reflect that market-oriented countries have similar positions on both indicators. Leaving countries in this category aside, the correlation between dual-earner and traditional-family support is negative and high (-.92).

discriminatory racial practices. In Australia and New Zealand, traditions of legislated wage-setting institutions involving significant public interventions in market processes as have been significant (Castles 1985) as have been their women's movements. In the early 1990s, Australian industrial relations commissions on federal and state levels played important roles in narrowing gender wage gaps according to equity principles (O'Connor et al. 1999).

While sharing market-oriented gender policies, three countries – Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan – appear as individually clearly separate cases. In Ireland, Catholicism has traditionally been very strong, a strength reflecting its history of opposition to protestant British rule. As a part of the United Kingdom up to independence in 1922, Ireland did not develop a Christian Democratic party of the Continental European model, yet the position of the Catholic Church has until recently remained strong, probably stronger than in any other of our countries. In Switzerland national policy making has been highly restricted by federal political structures, independent cantons, and the frequent use of popular referenda (Huber and Stephens 2001), restrictions contributing to preserve a market-oriented model. In a much different context, such a gender policy model is also found in Japan, where a secular center-right party has dominated during the post-war period.

As noted above, a central issue in the development of family policies has been if social care should be supported as unpaid work within the home, paid work in the public sector, or paid work in the private sector. Policy making in this area has been strongly influenced by the long-term strength within countries of political parties and normative roles of churches (Korpi 2000). In Continental Europe, the universal left-right dimension among Western countries is partly cross-cut by confessional parties, parties which have been of key importance in developing distinctive social policies in these countries (Korpi and Palme 1998; Korpi 2006). To appreciate the specific and central role of confessional parties in the making of family policies, we must recall that to a major extent their views have reflected teachings of the Catholic Church, the ideal of which has been the traditional family with a *pater familias* at its head and a mother devoted to the home. Since the late 19th century, this cultural script has been repeatedly underlined in the most authoritative source of the Catholic Church, the papal encyclicals. When gender policies started to change in the late 1960s, following this tradition Pope Paul VI (1971, paragraph 19), assailed “that false equality which would deny the distinction with woman's proper role, which is of such capital importance, at the heart of the family as well as within society.”²⁶ As can be expected, the traditional-family policy model is found in six Continental European countries with influential confessional parties.²⁷ Among secular parties, views on gender inequalities have differed along the left-right continuum. Parties on the left have long tended to be somewhat more receptive to gender equality than other major secular parties, a penchant indicated by a relatively high proportion of women they have traditionally elected to diets (Tingsten 1937, chap. 1; Norris 1987, chap. 6). To varying extents, secular center-right parties have held middle-class ideals of “separate spheres” for men and women (Reskin and Padavic 1994). In sum, confessional parties are thus expected to have been averse to family policies increasing women's paid work; secular center-right parties have avoided extending claim rights to facilitate women's advancement;

²⁶ Similar exhortations have been repeated since the famous “Workers' Encyclical” of 1891.

²⁷ All of these countries have been characterized by coalition governments, in which left parties have participated relatively often. With the exception of Austria, in all of them confessional parties have had longer government tenures than the left parties. In France the confessional party disappeared after the re-introduction of majoritarian elections in 1958.

left parties have tended to support family policies widening citizen's claim rights in ways transferring social care as paid work into the public sector.

FAMILY POLICIES AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

To what extent do our different family policy models support or counteract women's labor force participation? Drawing on our multidimensional family policy indicators outlined above we examine differences among family policy models in selection of women into the labor force. As discussed above, previous research has shown that gender egalitarian policies are associated with increased female labor force participation, but many analysts argue that this expansion involves a tradeoff between quantity and quality in that large public sectors of earner-carer countries attract women with low work involvement and psycho-social characteristics decreasing their chances to reach high wages and managerial positions. Our hypothesis is that differences among family policy models in selection processes into the labor force primarily concern women's educational levels and socio-economic backgrounds. By using multilevel statistical analysis, we combine macro-level data on national family policy settings and micro-level information on women's labor force participation in simultaneous analysis while controlling for individual level characteristics relevant for female employment: age, education, presence of young children and number of adults in the household. Lacking good class indicators in most databases on labor markets, levels of formal education here serve as a proxy for class. Individual level data are from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), where 15 of our 18 countries have relevant data from around 2000.²⁸

In comparative analyses combining micro- and macro-level data, ordinary multivariate regression techniques are inappropriate since they cover households nested in countries and therefore are not independent. Moreover, when including multilevel data in ordinary regression models, standard errors of variables at higher levels will be underestimated since degrees of freedom are calculated as if they were at the individual level. To deal with such problems, we use multilevel logistic regression models in which the intercept is allowed to vary between countries (Hox 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). In multi-level regression, correlated error terms are treated not as problems but instead as contributing information enhancing our understanding of the phenomena in focus. This method also permits us to calculate the variance partitioning coefficient (VPC), an estimate of the proportion of total variance attributable to the second level, here country level family policies. It should be noted that in a model with a binary outcome – for example, “in employment” or “not in employment” – interpretation of the VPC is only appropriate for what is termed the empty model, that is, without individual level covariates (Goldstein, 2003, pp 108-110).

We estimate multilevel models in the GLLAMM software that runs in STATA (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Analyses are restricted to women 25 to 54 years. Estimates from independent variables are reported as odds ratios. For categorical variables, odds ratio indicate deviation from a reference category, here set to 1. An odds ratio of 1.2 thus indicates 20 per cent higher odds as compared to the reference category, while an odds ratio of 0.8 indicates odds 20 per cent lower than the reference category. Of our family policy indicators, traditional-family support is measured as described above. Due to the high correlation between dual-earner and dual-carer support, these two variables are here additively combined into an earner-carer support indicator. Table 1 shows results using random intercept

²⁸ LIS-data for Switzerland have educational information only for household heads. Japan and New Zealand are not represented in the LIS.

regression models.²⁹ The VPC for Model 1, the empty model, is 0.076, indicating that 7.6 per cent of the total variation in female employment appears at the country level. The remaining proportion of variance, 92.4 per cent, is consequently found at the individual level. In multilevel analysis, a VPC of around 8 per cent can be considered as large.³⁰

In Table 1, Model 1 includes only the two institutional level indicators of traditional-family support and earner-carer support. Congruent with our expectations, earner-carer support tends to increase odds for female employment while traditional-family support is related to lower female employment. However, whereas the earner-carer variable is significant at the 1 per cent level, the traditional-family support indicator is only significant at the 10 per cent level. Formally, odds ratios here indicate that on average an increase of ten percentage points in the earner-carer variable would lead to an increase of female employment with 2 percentage points, while the same increase in the traditional-family variable decreases female employment with 0.6 percentage points.

(Table 1 about here)

Model 2 in this table includes only all micro-level variables. As could be expected, lower education as well as the presence of pre-school children are related to lower employment. Age has a curvilinear relationship with employment, as the middle age group (35-44 years) has the highest employment level. Moreover employment rises with the number of adults in the household, pointing to lower employment among single mothers. Models 3-6 combine the two family policy variables with each micro-level factor separately; they indicate that effects of family policy variables do not substantially change when including micro-level factors. In Model 7, all factors are included simultaneously, showing roughly similar correlations between macro-level variables and female employment as found in Model 1. In Model 8, cross-level interactions are introduced between family policy models and educational levels. Since interaction effects are often difficult to interpret from parameter estimates, Figure 2 graphically illustrates predicted interaction effects from regressions. We see that on average, increased earner-carer support is linked to higher female employment for all three educational groups. Somewhat weaker gradients for women with high education indicate a decreasing marginal return of earner-carer support, which has most effects on low and medium levels of education. Traditional-family policy has the opposite relationship to female employment for all educational groups; increasing this type of family support tends to decrease female employment, especially for groups with low education.

(Figure 2 about here)

Interactions between family policy variables as illustrated above capture main tendencies but also obscure important variation within clusters. Another way to illustrate interaction between family policies and individuals' educational levels is to plot separate country residuals, reflecting differences between observed participation rates and rates predicted on the basis of individual level variables. Figure 3 shows country residuals from separate multi-level models for each level of education, after controls for other individual level

²⁹ In regression analyses we use 30 quadrature points for all summations. Decreasing this number does not generate any substantively different results.

³⁰ As a rule of thumb, a VPC of 1, 4, 8 and 14 per cent corresponds to a standardized effect size viewed as small, medium, large and very large respectively (Duncan and Raudenbusch 1999).

characteristics, that is, net odds for female employment in different educational groups.³¹ Of interest here is to evaluate the extent to which countries with different types of family policies are located along lines of these broader policy clusters. Within each family policy model, countries are ranked according to residuals for women with low education.

The clustering of countries largely follows what can be expected from family policy structures, however also with some differences within clusters. Among countries classified as sharing the earner-carer model, 10 of 12 educational categories have employment residuals above average. Here, however, Finland has below average residuals for women with secondary and tertiary education, something possibly reflecting that it has partly contradictory policies with somewhat less of earner-carer support and more of traditional-family support than other countries in the category. Among traditional-family policy countries, 15 of 18 educational groups have below average employment among women, with especially low levels appearing in Italy and the Netherlands. We find mixed patterns of relatively low residuals among countries having market-oriented family policies. As discussed above, in this very heterogeneous group of countries we have distinguished Canada, United Kingdom and USA as having prototypical market-oriented policies. Of them USA as well as Canada have below average residuals for all educational categories while the opposite is found in United Kingdom. Also Australia has above average residuals, while Ireland deviates by having very low participation rates especially for women with the lowest level of education, here being relatively similar to Italy and the Netherlands, two countries where confessional parties have been especially strong. As noted above, Ireland is a clearly special case, with a historically very strong position of the Catholic Church. It should here be recalled that family policy institutions can also affect some micro-level outcomes in the multi-level regressions, especially the number of children in different countries. Differences among countries in the timing and structure of women's increase in employment may affect employment patterns over age cohorts.

(Figure 3 about here)

FAMILY POLICIES AND WOMEN WITH TOP WAGES

As discussed above, the hypothesis that a macro-characteristic of a country – its family policy model – affects the probability of women in the country to achieve top wages can not be tested by examination limited to women in employment; we must also consider differences among countries in socio-economic selection of women into employment. For several of these countries, information on hours worked to estimate hourly earnings is not found in the LIS database. Before moving to multilevel analyses, we therefore demonstrate the potential relevance of differences in socio-economic heterogeneity among employed women by comparing probabilities of employed women as well as of all women to reach top quintiles in hourly earnings in all our 18 countries, beginning by separate country analyses and complementing LIS data from reliable national sources (cf Methodological Appendix B). Earnings are measured as logged hourly gross wages. In Table 2, the first column shows the proportion of women in employment found in the top hourly earnings quintile of the population. Replicating earlier findings (Mandel and Semyonov 2006), we find differences among countries in terms of proportions of employed women with top hourly earnings. One

³¹ Since individual results here are interrelated, we use significance tests only sparingly and rely more on patterns of outcomes. In Figure 3, country residuals differ from zero at the five-percent level with the following exceptions: Australia (medium and high), Austria and France (low), Ireland (high) and Canada (medium).

of the highest top quintile proportions appears in Italy; one of the lowest in Sweden. On the basis of similar figures, Mandel and Semyonov (2006, p. 1917) claim to have found a “Welfare State Paradox.” But when we examine women’s representation in the top hourly earnings quintiles as proportions of all women in the country, this paradox disappears. In all countries and gender policy models, proportions of all women in top-earnings quintile are relatively low and roughly similar; the only exception here is Japan with a considerably lower proportion.

(Table 2 about here)

The above separate country analyses capture effects of family policies only in an indirect manner. Moving to multilevel regressions, with LIS-data we can simultaneously evaluate the relationship between different family policy models and women’s individual-level probabilities to attain high wage positions. Samples and estimation models as well as institutional and individual variables are the same as in analyses on employment in Table 1. Since information on hours worked are unavailable for several of these countries, we follow Mandel and Semyonov (2005) and use annual earnings to calculate our dependent variable – female representation in the top annual earnings quintile (Table 3). Results show that VPC for the empty model is relatively low; only 3.1 percent of the total variation in female top representation is explained at the country level, a considerably lower proportion than that found for female labor force participation. Multilevel regressions give little support for the hypothesis that earner-carer policies reduce women’s chances to reach high wage positions. In Model 1, the earner-carer indicator is not statistically significant, while traditional-family support is clearly linked to lower odds of women to reach the highest earnings quintile. When introduced together with institutional variables, micro-level factors have only limited influence on effects of family policy variables (Models 2-7).

(Table 3 about here)

Model 8 in Table 3 includes policy variables, individual characteristics as well as interaction effects and shows both policy variables to have weak negative coefficients. Figure 4 illustrates predicted interaction effects between family policies and education on women’s access to top quintiles in annual earnings. We see that both earner-carer and traditional-family policy variables tend to be related to somewhat lower odds of women with tertiary education to reach the highest wage quintile. Their decline indicates that the market-oriented family policy model with low values on both these variables may tend to increase women’s representations in top quintiles for this category of women. We also see that there is a tendency of earner-carer support to increase the probabilities of low educated women to reach top earnings positions, while a similar effect cannot be found for traditional-family support.

(Figure 4 about here)

Figure 5 shows country residuals for women’s net odds, that is, after control of other micro-level factors (Model 2 in Table 3) to reach top earnings. Within family policy models, countries are ranked according to size of residuals.³² The clustering of residuals in terms of family policy models is rather diffuse; each family policy cluster has a large variation in women’s chances to reach top earnings. Among earner-carer as well as traditional-family countries we find an even split in terms of residuals above and below the average. As argued above, among countries classified as having market-oriented family policies, USA, Canada and the United Kingdom stand out as having prototypical market-oriented family policies in the sense that such policies have been adopted largely as a choice by dominant secular center-

³² All residuals differ significantly from zero with the exception of Austria and Sweden,

right parties in the context of majoritarian elections. Focusing on these three prototypical market-oriented countries (indicated with a grey shade in Figure 5), patterns of residuals are rather mixed: in the United States below average, in Canada slightly above average, in the United Kingdom above average. On average these three prototypical market-oriented countries would not appear to provide strikingly better opportunities for women to reach top quintiles in annual earnings; on the other hand, they do not have residuals as clearly below average as is found in Italy, Norway and Finland. Among countries classified as having market-oriented family policies, the largest positive residuals appear in more marginal countries, that is, Ireland and Australia, countries combining to improve outcomes for the whole market-oriented category. As noted above, in Australia legislated wage arbitration boards focusing on “equal worth” have been important in wage setting (Orloff et al. 1999). Furthermore, as discussed above, in this context Ireland can be seen as a clearly unique case.

(Figure 5 about here)

WAGE GAPS, POWERFUL POSITIONS, OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND FEMALE TYPED JOBS

Gender Wage Gaps

As discussed above, widely accepted hypotheses hold that earner-carer countries have clearly higher gender wage gaps and lower proportions of women with high wages and powerful jobs while suffering more from very high occupational segregation and female-typed jobs than do women in countries with other types of family policies. Here gender wage gaps are relevant, since a person’s relative earnings is an important indicator of inequality in economic outcomes as well as agency potentials. As shown by economists and sociologists, in Western countries on the average women have lower gross earnings than men (Blau and Kahn 1996, 2003; England 2005; England, Budig, and Folbre 2002; Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Moller, and Nielsen 2009). As discussed above, gender wage gaps can be measured in terms of differences between men and women in gross earnings per time unit, usually hourly earnings.³³ Gender earnings inequalities are affected by forms of wage setting, where especially broad-based union-related collective bargaining as well as legal arbitration have been found to decrease wage gaps at medium and low levels of earnings (Blau and Kahn 1996, 2003). In the presence of such wage setting institutions, what appears as a glass ceiling indicated by differences between top and median wage gaps may instead reflect that some countries have lower wage gap at median levels of wage distributions. To examine potential glass ceilings among countries, we therefore focus on country differences in wage gaps at higher levels of wage distributions. Following established practice, we examine gender wage gaps in terms of percentage point differences between men and women in logged hourly earnings, focusing on wages in the period 1998-2000 at the 20th, 50th, 80th and at the 90th percentiles (cf Methodological Appendix G). We estimate both “raw” gaps and “adjusted” gaps when taking into account characteristics of individuals on a number of control variables (Table 4).³⁴ In this context we must however recall that also the best existing comparative

³³ Wage gaps are conventionally measured by ranking individuals into earnings distributions including men as well as women to determine the position of the percentile of interest in a country, observing proportions of men and women, respectively, above this percentile, and computing absolute or relative differences between men and women between these proportions. Here we have determined wage gaps by quantile regression, using sex as a dummy and adding control variables.

³⁴ Control variables are age, age-squared, education, marital status and presence of children below 6 years.

data sources on gender wage gaps are fraught with major problems reflecting differences among countries in ways of reporting earnings as well as hours worked. Because of these problems, all scholarly estimates on gender wage gaps are associated with considerable uncertainties.

(Table 4 about here)

Examining profiles of raw and adjusted wage gaps over the whole earnings distribution, we find a continuous increase from the 20th to the 90th percentiles in the four earner-carer countries with a major participation of unions in wage setting. Similar patterns also appear in Belgium with considerable union participation in wage setting as well as in Australia and New Zealand with traditions of legislated arbitration (Castles 1985; Hicks and Kenworthy 2003; O'Connor et al. 1999, p. 89; Visser and Checchi 2009). Besides the Netherlands (as well as France and Italy where information only on post-tax wages make comparisons difficult), other countries with traditional-family or market-oriented family policies have higher raw and adjusted wage gaps at the 20th and 50th percentiles than have earner-carer countries. Focusing on raw as well as adjusted wage gaps at the 80th and 90th percentiles, in earner-carer countries gender wage gaps are roughly similar to those of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, countries which we above have described as prototypical market-oriented countries, however with Canada appearing to have lower gaps at the 90th percentile.

The above findings thus support our expectations that definitions of gender wage gaps in terms of differences between top and median levels of earnings as used by several economists to locate glass ceilings have been clearly misleading. When focusing on top earnings deciles, earner-carer countries have gender wage gaps roughly similar to those in prototypical market-oriented countries. Together with countries where wage setting institutions involve broad-based unions or legal arbitration, earner-carer countries have lower gender wage gaps than most other countries.

Managerial Positions and Corporate Boards

In evaluating hypotheses that earner-carer policies induce negative tradeoffs deterring women from reaching top positions of power and authority, we examine gendered compositions of managerial occupations in countries with different types of gender policy models.³⁵ As has been shown in earlier studies, countries differ in terms of proportions of occupations classified as managers, with USA and Ireland having a larger proportion than most other countries (Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund 1995). We examine gender managerial gaps among employees within a country. Because of possible country differences in “looseness” of classification of managerial positions, we also determine gender managerial gaps at the top half, top third, and top fifth of the earnings distribution among all employees (cf Methodological Appendix H). Looking at all managers as a percentage of all employees in ten countries for which comparable data are available, as expected we find considerable differences among countries with the highest proportion in USA (Table 5).³⁶ Looking at all managers, gender gaps are very small in some countries, among them USA, Austria, Italy and Sweden, but are to some extent present in other countries. Focusing on gender gaps among managers in the upper half, the upper third, and the upper fifth of the total earnings

³⁵ It can be noted that proportions of self-employed differ considerably among countries, and among them relatively large proportions are classified as managers.

³⁶ Because of few countries involved, the use of multilevel analysis is here not advisable.

distributions among employees, US gender gaps increase to roughly reach levels found in most other countries. Relevant here is the absence of clear patterns of differences among countries with different family policy models; here earner-carer countries are thus roughly similar to USA.

(Table 5 about here)

Hypotheses that family policy models differ in terms of the extent to which they permit women to enter positions of power in the private sector can be further evaluated by examining women's access to positions on company boards in the largest firms in 16 countries, using data which have only recently become available (cf Methodological Appendix I). Among European countries, proportions of women in corporate boards are affected by a gender quota in Norway and in some other countries by legislation requiring employee representatives in company boards.³⁷ Inspecting figures on women's share of all board members before adjusting for such legislation, we find a large range, from a low of four percent in Italy to a high of 41 percent in Norway (Table 6). The high figure in Norway is partly due to its legislated gender quota, since 2006 requiring a 40-60 percent sex balance in publicly listed companies.³⁸ Also other countries with the earner-carer model have relatively high percentages of women in boards of the largest companies: Sweden 26, Finland 20, and Denmark 17. Here Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, USA, and the United Kingdom form an intermediate category, with women having 12-15 percent in boards of the largest companies. In Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, and Switzerland, less than ten percent of board members are women.

(Table 6)

Of employee representatives in the boards of large companies in the European Union, women account for around 20 percent with the highest proportions in Germany and the Nordic countries. Exclusion of employee representatives and a focus on women among board members representing shareholders does not reverse this general picture; however the percentage of women decreases in Denmark, Austria, and Germany.³⁹ Here the few observations on regular board members in traditional-family countries indicate clearly lower levels than among earner-carer countries.

Occupational Segregation and Female Typed Work

As noted above, hypotheses that earner-carer family policies will lead to high occupational segregation as well as to major concentrations of women in female-typed work have been widely seen as established facts. Measurement of horizontal gender occupational segregation is however problematic. For example, it is possible that occupational arenas traditionally dominated by men tend to be differentiated into more numerous sub-categories than are recently expanding areas of women's work (Löfström 2004, Chap. 2).⁴⁰ In analyses of segregation, a much used measure is the dissimilarity index (D), reflecting the percentage of men and women that would have to be moved from a data set to make for a perfect correspondence between the sex composition of each occupation and the entire labor force

³⁷ In most countries, employee representatives on company boards formally have the same rights as board members representing the shareholders, with the exception of issues related to industrial disputes.

³⁸ The share of women in boards of the largest companies in Norway thus increased from 31 to 41 percent between 2005 and 2008.

³⁹ Sprinklings of data available on women among central executive officers in the largest private corporations suggest that they are exceedingly rare in countries examined here.

⁴⁰ Cf occupational areas such as technicians and engineers vs health care and social care.

(Duncan and Duncan 1955). This index is sensitive to differences among countries in the size of occupational categories. We therefore also use the Index of Association (A), which reflects the extent to which sex ratios within different categories of occupations deviate from the mean of ratios calculated across all categories of occupations (Charles and Grusky 2004, p. 42).

In examining horizontal occupational segregation as traditionally defined on the basis of the distribution of employed men and women among 23 different occupational categories (cf Methodological Appendix F), we find relatively muted overall differences among countries with different gender policy institutions, and earner-carer countries consistently fail to appear as distinctive (Table 7).⁴¹ According to the D-index, half of our countries are found within a narrow band of values (46-48), namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. A somewhat higher value appears in Finland, while the lowest ones are found in Italy, USA, France, and Austria. The A-index shows a relatively similar pattern, with somewhat higher values in Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, and again low values in France, Italy, Germany, and USA, now with Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium in between.⁴² In these terms, while gendered occupational segregation differs somewhat among countries, differences do not strongly overlap with family policy models.

(Table 7 about here)

Women in earner-carer countries have often been seen as relegated to “female-typed jobs.” This label conveys traditional connotations of women’s work as disadvantaged in terms of wages, work conditions, employment security, and skills (England 1992). This traditional lens has been used for characterizing major parts of social care work in public sectors of earner-carer countries in terms of menial and unqualified jobs. Thus, for example, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) take large proportions of women in same occupational category as a significant criterion for gender inequality. Pointing to Denmark and Sweden, they claim support for the view that in these countries, large public sectors

“did not alter the traditional division of labor between men and women, [instead] it actually transferred the gendered division of labor from the private sphere into the public domain, ... while men get hold of more desirable jobs. [In] a large ‘protected’ public sector women are likely to be relegated mostly to female-typed service jobs, [into] feminine niches [offering] job protection and convenient working conditions” (2006, pp. 1916,1917).

Mandel and Semyonov thus appear to conjure an image of public sectors in these two countries as having crowds of women in less qualified but convenient and protected jobs, work reminding us of child-minders looking after children but not doing it very intensively. They have however not recognized that in the earner-carer countries with large public sectors, such as Denmark and Sweden, early childhood education and care has developed to high professional standards, where preschool teachers, constituting one third of personnel in center-based and preprimary care, are required to have at least three years of university training (Gornick and Meyers 2003, pp. 220-223). In Sweden in 2009, somewhat more than half of preschool teachers had tertiary education and almost all others occupational training at

⁴¹ Information for Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have not been available. Because of the small number of countries with this information in the LIS database, multilevel analyses are not advisable.

⁴² In their study, Charles and Grusky (2004, p. 71) note that Sweden appears to have middling levels of occupational segregation.

the secondary level (Skolverket 2010).⁴³ Anglophone countries with small public sectors tend to have much lower requirements for staff education. In the Nordic and also in some other European countries, female dominance in social care is likely to primarily reflect what Charles and Grusky (2004, p. 17) call horizontal segregation, where “deeply rooted and widely shared cultural beliefs about gender differences are ideologically compatible with liberal egalitarian norms.” Such gender differentiation is likely to largely reflect socialization (England 2005). In discussions of female-typed work, the archetypical feminine niche – homemakers – has typically been overlooked (cf Methodological Appendix E). Reflecting their higher proportions of women in the labor force, earner-carer countries have the clearly lowest shares of women describing themselves as homemakers (Table 7). The highest shares of homemakers are found in contexts of traditional-family policies.

The above results point to the lack of empirical evidence for widely accepted hypotheses on tradeoffs generated by earner-carer policies, decreasing women’s opportunities to reach high wages or positions of power and authority and to avoid high occupational segregation and female-typed job.

DISCUSSION

Policies to decrease age-old traditions of gender inequalities are bound to run into problems. Gender equality has nowhere been achieved, but we can examine the extent to which different types of family policy models have contributed to approach this goal. Reform efforts activate traditional tensions associated with gender divisions as well as with division of responsibilities between private and public sectors of Western societies, choices generating unavoidable tradeoffs between differently valued aspects. The separate dimensions emerging in our typology of family policies reflect economic and cultural cleavages structuring broad-based collective action and partisan politics among Western countries: the left-right cleavage running through all countries and in Continental Europe is partly modified by confessional parties associated with Catholicism. In this context also women’s collective mobilization to change social norms on gender relations has been important. These cleavages have significantly structured transformations of social care since the 1960’s. We advance research in this area by moving from a focus on classification of countries to improvement of causal analysis by identification of separate institutional structures mediating effects of actors on outcomes with respect to gender inequalities, structures which also are necessary in analyzing policy changes. However, in several countries – prominently so in Ireland, Japan and Switzerland – unique factors have contributed to shape gender policies and inequalities. Our analyses clearly contradict assumptions of uni-dimensional family policies now accepted by many scholars.

Analysts face difficult choices in identifying indicators of gender inequalities. We argue that in this context we must consider not only material inequality and subjective satisfaction but also inequalities with respect to capabilities to choose over a range of alternatives, with women’s labor force participation as one major indicator. In the choice between paid and unpaid work, differences in women’s individual values are important. In this discussion it is relevant to recall that among women with higher education, family policies have only a modest influence on labor force participation rates; women most likely to have individual resources enabling them to make a real choice tend to choose paid work. We show that major

⁴³ In Sweden, working-class women in the public sector tend to have more intrinsic engagement in their work and to have job qualities on par with or better than those in the private sector (Paper by authors).

effects of family policies are instead visible primarily among women without tertiary education, facilitating or discouraging them in making choices similar to those of their economically and educationally more favored fellow country-women. Our family policy models thus clearly differentiate countries in terms of capabilities associated with labor force participation in ways pointing to important interactions between family policies and women's socio-economic backgrounds. The earner-carer model has contributed more in terms of bringing also women without a college degree into employment than have prototypical market-oriented policies developed in USA, Canada, and the United Kingdom, countries which in turn tend to have lower gender agency inequalities than most countries with traditional-family policies.

Since women have intermittent work more often than men, in all countries they face serious risks for employer statistical discrimination and difficulties for human capital accumulation hindering them from occupational advancement. While making highly problematic causal interpretations, earlier analysts have gained a wide hearing for assertions that countries encouraging women's employment by transferring social care work to the public sector face a severe tradeoff between quantity and quality of employment in ways decreasing women's access to top wages and positions of power. Sociologists have come to this conclusion by limiting attention to employed women only, neglecting differences among countries in the socio-economic and educational composition of women in employment. Economists have relied on misleading definitions of wage ceilings in terms of increases of gender wage gaps from the median to the top, overlooking effects of broad-based wage setting on gender wage gaps at median levels. When we take account of socio-economic differences in women's probabilities to join the labor force, differences among countries in women's chances to enter the top earnings quintiles are subdued; only Japan stands out with much lower probabilities. General hypotheses that earner-carer policies soften the will as well as the capabilities of women to attain powerful and prestigious positions are questioned by our findings of only small differences among countries in gender managerial gaps. New data on women's access to boards of large corporations clearly contradict such a hypothesis, indicating that board membership appears to be found more often in earner-carer countries than in prototypical market-oriented ones, while women under traditional-family policies tend to be at a disadvantage. From an egalitarian perspective, the higher potential for women without university education and with working class backgrounds in earner-carer countries to enter the labor force appears as a major achievement, decreasing both class and gender inequalities. Under other types of family policies, these women are more often found in feminine niches as homemakers or with only marginal labor force attachment.⁴⁴

By being, on the average, more available and affordable as well as having higher quality and continuity, provision of social care via the public sector is likely to be more effective in supporting mothers' paid work than are provisions via the private sector. Judiciously designed parental leave programs improve incentives for women to enter and to remain in the labor force. In most countries with traditional-family or market-oriented gender policies, we find more of short part-time work, longer interruptions in connection of childbirth, and difficulties

⁴⁴ Examining women's representation in politically influential positions in cabinets and diets of our countries, we find that partisan politics as well as the electoral models have been clearly relevant. Among countries with proportional elections, since the 1960s earner-carer countries have had clearly higher proportion of women than traditional-family countries. Market-oriented countries with majoritarian elections have had relatively low proportions of women in elected positions (author paper).

in finding child care, factors likely to generate even more severe motherhood penalties.⁴⁵ Earner-carer countries have long had a largely undeserved reputation for having extremely segregated occupational structures. As shown here, their occupational segregation is probably not worse than in many other countries. Bad as this may be, horizontal job segregation is often seen as compatible with egalitarianism, at least as long as it is not associated with lower job quality or markedly lower wages.

The transfer of social care to the public sector is however associated with other forms of tradeoffs. One critical tradeoff concerns wage effects of public sector employment, tending to decrease wage dispersion at the lower as well as at the higher ends of wage distributions. Differences between private and public sectors with respect to top wages reflect differences in the nature of services produced as well as in constraints for wage setting. Public sector social care services are in principle public goods, benefiting all, and therefore creating free-riding when non-contributing persons can not be excluded from benefits (England and Folbre 1999). Many direct beneficiaries of care are economically dependent. Wage setting in the public sector is indirectly as well as directly influenced by decision-making in the context of political democracy, where available wage funds are determined by relatively well organized and mobilized tax payers. In the private sector, the rule often is to take from typically unorganized customers what competition on markets can bear. Since the early 1980's, in most of our countries, the very top wages in the private sector – mostly to men – have accelerated dramatically (Atkinson and Piketty 2007). In the earner-carer countries, this change was of relevance for increases of public-private differences in wages, with larger increases for men than for women. In the same period, the long decrease of gender wage gaps in these countries came to a halt.

It is somewhat ironic that while analysts have described women's work in earner-carer countries as convenient, less demanding, and secure, they have largely bypassed a serious problem: the possibility that in these countries, under specific circumstances pressures on women in the public sector may increase more than on those in the private sector.⁴⁶ An example here is Sweden, which suffered a severe depression in the early 1990s, when the long postwar period of full employment was replaced by mass unemployment at two-digit levels. In combination with the political run-up to fulfill financial requirements for the new European Monetary Union, serious restrictions on public expenditures resulted in a massive shedding of personnel in the public sector. Since the demand for social care services certainly did not decrease, in the public sector the remaining personnel had to face greater strain.⁴⁷ Surveys indicate that in the 1990s, the prevalence of negative stress among women increased more in the social care sector than in the private retail sector.⁴⁸ Although there were only minor increases in gender wage gaps in the public sector, as noted above in this period both men and women in the public sector saw their wages fall behind those in the private sector, where especially top wages for men have escalated.⁴⁹ Finland went through similar processes.

Trade-offs with opposite signs appears to be associated with childcare and fertility. In Continental Europe, countries with traditional-family policy model tend to combine relatively

⁴⁵Gornick, Meyers, and Ross (1998); Paper by authors..

⁴⁶ An exception here is Gornick and Jacobs (1998: p.108).

⁴⁷ In Swedish preschools, the average number of children per employee increased from 4.4 in 1990 up to 5.7 in 1998 and has remained at this level up to 2009 (Skolverket 2010-03-30)

⁴⁸ Negative stress is defined as work which is strenuous while not allowing the individual to determine work pace (le Grand, Szulkin, and Thålin 2001b).

⁴⁹ le Grand, Szulkin, and Thålin (2001a). Wages were standardized for education and experience.

low female labor force participation with low fertility rates. The earner-carer model is found to have positive effects on fertility rates (Björklund 2006; Ferrarini 2006; Neyer and Andersson 2008; Oláh and Bernhardt 2008). Furthermore, while in some European countries fertility rates tend to be low among families with high education, in earner-carer countries birth rates are more evenly distributed among socio-economic levels (Organization for Economic and Cultural Development 2007). Possibilities to transfer the earner-carer model to other countries have been debated (Gornick and Meyers 2008; Shalev 2008).⁵⁰ Some economists argue that earner-carer policies have a major drawback by being expensive and constituting burdens on public budgets (Datta Gupta et al. 2008). In a parallel to expenditures for general education, however, also expenditures for early childhood education can be seen as investments in human capital likely to give future benefits. Studies indicate that the earner-carer model tends to have positive effects on children's wellbeing and development (Ministry of Social Affairs 2001; Waldfogel 2002, 2004) as well as on child poverty rates, especially among single mothers (Bäckman and Ferrarini 2010; Hobson and Takahasi 1997; Misra, Moller and Budig 2007; Smeeding and Rainwater 1995).

The above discussion points to tensions in the relationship between class inequality and gender inequality. These tensions bring up the question if gender inequality is to be decreased over the whole range of socio-economic positions, or if gender inequality at the top should be decreased even at the cost of increasing socio-economic inequalities among women. This policy dilemma emerges in the suggestion that the advancement of more women to top earnings should be facilitated by some women having access to cheap maid services generated by widening class inequality so that an increasing number of working-class women are willing to accept low-paid private service jobs. A variant of this alternative is now well underway in several Western countries, where increasing flows of immigrant women from low-income countries form what has been referred to as an international chain of care to take such jobs in the rich countries (Crompton 2006). The earner-carer model offers a more complex alternative not premised on a widening of class inequality: the promotion of a more equal sharing of parental child care. In the context of relatively generous parental leave benefits as well as affordable and good public child care, the first beginnings of such tendencies can be seen in earner-carer countries.⁵¹ In a historical perspective on inequalities, it can be recalled that since the mid-19th century, gender inequalities have tended to decrease hand-in-hand with class inequalities; after the 1970s these two components of inequality have parted company. Class inequality reflected in widening income differences has turned to marked upsurge; the decline of gender inequalities has accelerated.

⁵⁰ To improve its very low reproduction rates, in 2007 the German confessional-left cabinet introduced a Scandinavian model of parental leave.

⁵¹ In Sweden and Norway in 2003/4, fathers used around 15 percent of total parental leave days. In Denmark and Finland not having "use or lose" rules for father's leave, take-up was around 5 percent (Morgan 2008).

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Abbreviations: Two-letter country labels as in country internet addresses.

Tables: - Denotes missing information.

A. Country Scores for Family Policy Variables (Normalized Values (Average = 0; Deviation = 1))

	Traditional Family	Dual Earner	Dual Carer	Earner-Carer
Australia	-1.32	-1.34	-1.01	-1.17
Austria	1.30	-1.42	-1.01	-1.22
Belgium	3.95	-0.25	-0.72	-0.49
Canada	-2.07	-1.88	-0.34	-1.11
Denmark	-0.43	4.89	0.95	2.92
Finland	-0.79	2.90	2.47	2.69
France	2.30	0.13	-0.72	-0.30
Germany	4.38	-1.59	-1.01	-1.30
Ireland	-1.25	-1.63	-1.01	-1.32
Italy	2.18	-0.96	-1.01	-0.98
Japan	-2.11	-0.34	-1.01	-0.67
Netherlands	1.65	-0.29	-1.01	-0.65
New Zealand	-0.30	-1.58	-1.01	-1.29
Norway	-1.11	4.22	3.52	3.87
Sweden	-1.88	5.82	5.95	5.89
Switzerland	-0.45	-2.45	-1.01	-1.73
United Kingdom	-1.33	-1.13	-1.01	-1.07
USA	-2.72	-3.14	-1.01	-2.07

Data on family policy institutions are from several sources. Information on generosity of cash as well as fiscal family benefits are from The Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) (<https://dSPACE.it.su.se/dSPACE/handle/10102/7>). Useful comparative data sources on public daycare and parental leave have been European Union Eurydice database on education systems and policies in Europe (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/eurybase_en.php); Comparative Family Policy Database (Gornick and Meyers 2003); Bradshaw and Finch (2002); OECD (2007); Parental Leave Benefit Dataset (2009); Nordic Council Social Statistical Committee, NOSOSCO (<http://nom-nos-indicators.skl.se/sif/start/>); European Union Mutual Information System on social Protection, MISSOC (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/Missoc_en.html)

B. Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and Luxembourg Employment Study (LES)

Luxembourg Income Study (<http://www.lisproject.org>) is a data archive with harmonized micro-data from a number of countries on incomes, labor market participation, and education as well as on demographic characteristics. In most countries original data come from national surveys with numbers of respondents varying from about 4 000 up to 15 000 but around

20 000 in France, Germany and Italy up to more than 50 000 in Canada, United Kingdom and the United States. In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden information on incomes comes from national registers. A comparison in 1996 in Finland between income information from registers and a survey indicates that mean net cash income in the top decile is 17 percent higher in register data than in survey data; in the lowest decile, register data indicate 10 percent lower income than survey data (Nordberg, Penttilä and Sandström 2001). Luxembourg Employment Study (LES) includes harmonized data from labor force surveys in a number of LIS member countries and is available at LIS but no longer updated.

C. European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)

EU- SILC (<http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/dsis/eusilc/library>) has micro-data from special surveys on income, labor market, demographic and educational data for households and individuals in EU member countries and Norway. Numbers of respondents range from 6 000 to about 16 000.

D. Employment and Wages

All data for the multilevel analyses on employment and wages come from the fifth wave of LIS around 2000 and cover the following countries and years: Netherlands, United Kingdom (1999); Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and USA, (2000); Australia (2001). A number of indicators are used to define employment to assure that an individual is in paid civilian employment during the income reference period. Self-employed and farmers are excluded in the analyses.

European Labour Force Survey with standardized information is found at http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/employment/info/data/eu_lfs/index.htm

E. Homemakers

Homemakers are defined among married and cohabiting women (35-64 years). For most European countries, homemakers are delineated in the EU- SILC 2004 in terms of self-defined current economic status (“Fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities”); in Germany and Netherlands, European Union labor force surveys (“Unemployed persons not seeking employment because of personal or family responsibilities, Belief that no work is available, Other non-defined reasons”); Switzerland (LIS) 2002 (“Doing homework”), USA (“Not employed;” “Homemaker”). In the United Kingdom, the Luxembourg Employment Study (LES) is used with similar definitions.

F. Horizontal Occupational Segregation

For the majority of countries, occupational segregation indexes are based on EU-SILC 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden,). For Germany and the Netherlands data come from EU Labour Force Survey; for Switzerland 2002 and USA 2000 from LIS; for UK 1997 from LES. Occupations have been coded according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), coded at the two-digit level into 23 categories (<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/index.htm>).

ISCO-88

Code	Occupation
11-13	Managers
21	Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals
22	Life science and health professionals
23	Teaching professionals
24	Other professionals
31	Physical and engineering science associate professionals
32	Life science and health associate professionals
33	Teaching associate professionals
34	Other associate professionals
41	Office clerks
42	Customer services clerks
51	Personal and protective services workers
52	Models, salespersons and demonstrators
61+92	Agricultural, fishery and related workers and labourers
71	Extraction and building trade workers
72	Metal, machinery and related trades workers
73	Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers
74	Other craft and related trades workers
81	Stationary-plant and related operators
82	Machine operators and assemblers
83	Drivers and mobile plant operators
91	Sales and services elementary occupations
93	Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport

Because of small samples in some countries, we merged three categories of managers (11-13) into a single one, as we did with skilled agricultural and fishery workers (61) and agricultural, fishery and related laborers (92). For the United Kingdom and the United States, we recoded the occupational variable included in LES and LIS according to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) into ISCO-88.

F. Gender Wage Gaps

Gender wage gaps are defined in terms of the difference between proportions of men and proportions of women above a specified percentile in the pooled wage distribution for both sexes. Data are here limited to full and part-time civilian employees, excluding persons with less than 10 or over 100 weekly hours of work. Wage gaps are calculated by quantile regressions as differences between men and women in logged hourly gross wages at, respectively, 20th, 50th, 80th, and 90th percentiles with LIS as the main source (Australia 2001, Austria 2000, Belgium 2000, Canada 2000, France 2000, Germany 2000, Ireland 2000, Italy 2000, Netherlands 1999, United Kingdom 1999, USA 2000, Finland 1991, and Switzerland 1992). National data sources are used for Norway (Level of Living Survey 2000), Sweden (Level of Living Survey 2000), Japan (Japanese General Social Survey 2000). For New Zealand (2001) data come from Organization of Economic and Cultural Development (2002, p. 97). Danish information on wage gaps are based on the same national register source as

income information in LIS. We thank Mette Deding for helpful assistance with Danish data. Detailed descriptions of data handling are available from authors.

G. Managerial Occupations

Managerial occupations are based on the EU-SILC 2004 using ISCO-88 at the two-digit level (cf above). Data for United States come from LIS (2000), where we used Ganzeboom's algorithm for translation of occupational classifications into ISCO-88 (<http://home.fsw.vu.nl/hbg.ganzeboom/ismf/ismf.htm>). Farmers, military personnel, self-employed and family workers are excluded.

H. Women in Corporate Boards

European data come from the European Commission, stating women's share of boards in the largest publicly quoted companies (European Commission 2009. Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making Bodies") covering a maximum of 50 largest publicly quoted companies in each country

(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/women_men_stats/defcon_en.htm#L).

Companies registered abroad are excluded. Comparable data for women in the largest companies in Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States have been assembled by Catalyst (<http://www.catalyst.org>), a non-profit organization specializing on issues related to women and work.




FIG. 1. – Three dimensions and models of family policies in 18 Countries in 2000.

(Size of grey blots indicate degree of Dual-Carer Support. Countries are identified by their internet suffixes.)




FIG. 2. – Interactions between education and family policies on employment.

(X-values range from the lowest to the highest country observations on policy variables)




FIG. 3. – Residuals from multilevel analysis on women's employment, by levels of education attainments and family policy models.




FIG. 4. Interactions between education and family policies on top wages

(X-values range from the lowest to the highest country observations on policy variables)




Fig. 5 Residuals from multilevel analysis on effects of individual characteristics on women's top wages by family policy model (Table 3, Model 2).

TABLE 1
FAMILY POLICY AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT.
ODDS RATIOS FROM RANDOM INTERCEPT LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS OF MACRO- AND MICRO-LEVEL
DETERMINANTS IN 15 COUNTRIES AROUND 2000 (WOMEN 25-54 YEARS).

Independent variables	Model – Odds ratios (p-values in parentheses)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Traditional Earner-carer	,94 (.077) 1,18 (.000)	- -	,95 (.188) 1,16 (.000)	,93 (.016) 1,18 (.000)	,93 (.001) 1,20 (.000)	,94 (.000) 1,20 (.000)	,95 (.030) 1,19 (.000)	,96 (.306) 1,15 (.000)
Education								
High (ref)	-	#	#	-	-	-	#	#
Medium	-	,64 (.000)	,65 (.000)	-	-	-	,64 (.000)	,62 (.000)
Low	-	,25 (.000)	,27 (.000)	-	-	-	,25 (.000)	,25 (.000)
Age								
25-34 (ref)	-	#	-	#	-	-	#	#
35-44	-	1,10 (.000)	-	1,23 (.000)	-	-	1,10 (.000)	1,10 (.000)
45-54	-	,92 (.000)	-	1,16 (.000)	-	-	,92 (.000)	,92 (.000)
Children								
No child (ref)	-	#	-	-	#	-	#	#
Child 0-2	-	,37 (.000)	-	-	,44 (.000)	-	,37 (.000)	,37 (.000)
Child 3-5	-	,55 (.000)	-	-	,61 (.000)	-	,55 (.000)	,55 (.000)
Child 6+	-	,89 (.000)	-	-	,93 (.000)	-	,89 (.000)	,89 (.000)
Adults	-	1,02 (.000)	-	-	-	,99 (.394)	1,02 (.002)	1,13 (.002)
Interactions								
Trad x educ. Medium								,96 (.000)
Trad x educ. Low								1,01 (.328)
Dual x educ. Medium								1,02 (.009)
Dual x educ. Low								1,01 (.097)
N (level 1)	133 014	133 013	133 014	133 014	133 014	133 013	133 013	133 013
Level 2 Variance (Standard error)	0,09 (0,032)	0,25 (0,093)	0,09 (0,033)	0,09 (0,033)	0,12 (0,021)	0,11 (0,037)	0,13 (0,024)	0,10 (0,033)
Log likelihood	-78 424,12	-73 924,49	-75 491,89	-78 320,87	-77 199,28	-78 404,07	-73 917,83	-73 893,93
Empty model								
N (level 1)	133 014							
Level 2 Variance (Standard error)	0,27 (0,100)							
Log likelihood	-78 432,71							
VPC ($V/(V+\pi^2/3)$)	0,076							

TABLE 2
 WOMEN (25-55 YEARS) IN THE TOP EARNINGS QUINTILE AS PROPORTIONS
 OF EMPLOYED WOMEN AND AS PROPORTIONS OF ALL WOMEN AROUND 2000,
 BY TYPES OF FAMILY POLICY MODELS.

Type of Family Policy Model		Women in the Top Earnings Quintile among	
		Employed Women	All Women
Earner – Carer	Denmark	0.12	0.09
	Finland	0.12	0.10
	Norway	0.11	0.09
	Sweden	0.12	0.10
Market Oriented	Canada	0.12	0.09
	United Kingdom	0.15	0.10
	USA	0.15	0.11
	Australia	0.16	0.11
	Ireland	0.20	0.11
	Japan	0.07	0.04
Traditional Family	Austria	0.11	0.08
	Belgium	0.10	0.07
	France	0.16	0.11
	Germany	0.10	0.08
	Italy	0.20	0.09
	Netherlands	0.15	0.10

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix D.

TABLE 3
 FAMILY POLICY AND WOMEN'S TOP WAGES (ABOVE 80TH PERCENTILE).
 ODDS RATIOS FROM RANDOM INTERCEPT LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS OF MACRO- AND MICRO-LEVEL
 DETERMINANTS IN 15 WELFARE STATES AROUND 2000 (WOMEN 25-54 YEARS).

Independent variables	Model – Odds ratios (p-values in parenthesis)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Traditional	,94 (.017)	-	,94 (.144)	,94 (.029)	,94 (.012)	,94 (.007)	,95 (.179)	,91 (.042)
Earned-carer	1,01 (.613)	-	,96 (.239)	1,01 (.705)	1,01 (.597)	1,02 (.183)	,95 (.213)	,90 (.013)
Education								
High (ref)	-	#	#	-	-	-	#	#
Medium	-	,23 (.000)	,23 (.000)	-	-	-	,23 (.000)	,22 (.000)
Low	-	,07 (.000)	,07 (.000)	-	-	-	,07 (.000)	,05 (.000)
Age								
25-34 (ref)	-	#	-	#	-	-	#	#
35-44	-	2,00 (.000)	-	1,68 (.000)	-	-	2,00 (.000)	2,01 (.000)
45-54	-	2,20 (.000)	-	1,95 (.000)	-	-	2,20 (.000)	2,23 (.000)
Children								
No child (ref)	-	#	-	-	#	-	#	#
Child 0-2	-	,53 (.000)	-	-	,46 (.000)	-	,53 (.000)	,54 (.000)
Child 3-5	-	,65 (.000)	-	-	,59 (.000)	-	,65 (.000)	,66 (.000)
Child 6+	-	,71 (.000)	-	-	,76 (.000)	-	,71 (.000)	,72 (.000)
Adults	-	,83 (.000)	-	-	-	,83 (.000)	,83 (.000)	,83 (.000)
Interactions								
Trad x educ. Medium								1,08 (.005)
Trad x educ. High								1,18 (.000)
Dual x educ. Medium								1,12 (.000)
Dual x educ. High								1,32 (.000)
N (level 1)	132 504	132 503	132 504	132 504	132 504	132 503	132 503	132 503
Level 2 Variance (Standard error)	0,04 (0,017)	0,12 (0,048)	0,09 (0,037)	0,11 (0,036)	0,06 (0,021)	0,12 (0,048)	0,11 (0,042)	0,12 (0,046)
Log likelihood	-34 931,39	-30 696,59	-31 476,73	-34 609,92	-34 640,84	-34 841,47	-30 695,35	-30 544,44
Empty model								
N (level 1)	132 504							
Level 2 Variance (Standard error)	0,11 (0,036)							
Log likelihood	-34 936,14							
VPC ($V/(V+\pi^2/3)$)	0,031							

TABLE 4
 RAW AND ADJUSTED GROSS GENDER WAGE GAPS IN LOGGED HOURLY EARNINGS BY TYPE OF
 FAMILY POLICY MODELS (25-54 YEARS) AROUND 2000. (PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCES)

Type of Family Policy Model		Percentiles							
		Raw				Adjusted			
		20	50	80	90	20	50	80	90
Earner - Carer	Denmark	10	13	23	30	-	-	-	-
	Finland	17	23	32	35	20	24	29	32
	Norway	14	15	24	33	13	17	25	27
	Sweden	11	15	20	25	12	17	24	29
Market Oriented	Canada	28	25	19	19	30	28	25	24
	USA	25	25	27	30	26	28	29	30
	United Kingdom	32	32	29	32	29	30	29	30
	Australia	7	11	16	21	7	10	17	20
	New Zealand**	7	13	17	-	-	-	-	-
	Ireland	20	19	14	16	21	21	18	18
	Japan	46	58	49	41	49	49	35	29
Switzerland	46	31	24	22	-	-	-	-	
Traditional Family	Austria	23	22	16	17	21	20	15	13
	Belgium	7	8	14	15	10	12	16	17
	France*	14	12	13	15	18	15	16	17
	Germany	28	20	20	20	29	20	18	17
	Italy*	10	7	7	1	9	9	11	11
Netherlands	17	13	18	19	18	11	9	8	

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix G.

* Net earnings.

** 20-64 years.

Control variables are age, age-squared, education, marital status and presence of children below 6 years.

TABLE 5
 GENDER GAPS IN MANAGERIAL OCCUPATIONS AT DIFFERENT EARNINGS LEVELS AMONG EMPLOYEES
 (25-54 YEARS), BY TYPES OF FAMILY POLICY MODELS (PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCES).

Type of Family Policy Model		Managers Among all Employees (%)	Gender Managerial Gaps at Different Earnings Levels			
			All Managers	Upper Half	Upper Third	Upper Fifth
Earner – Carer	Denmark	6	5	6	5	4
	Finland	8	6	6	6	5
	Norway	10	6	7	7	5
	Sweden	4	2	2	2	2
Market Oriented	USA	16	1	5	5	5
	Ireland	13	6	8	8	6
Family Traditional	Austria	2	2	3	2	2
	Belgium	6	6	6	5	5
	France	7	4	4	4	3
	Italy	2	2	2	2	2

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix (H).

TABLE 6
 WOMEN ON BOARDS OF THE LARGEST COMPANIES IN 16 COUNTRIES IN 2008,
 BY TYPES OF FAMILY POLICY MODEL (%).

Type of Family Policy Model	Companies On Index Covered	Female Total Board Members (Including Employee Representatives)	Female Regular Board Members (Excluding Employee Representatives)
Earner – Carer	Denmark	18	11
	Finland	24	20
	Sweden	27	25
	Norway	19	42
Market Oriented	Canada	-	-
	United Kingdom	-	-
	United States	-	-
	Australia	-	-
	Ireland	20	-
	Switzerland	-	-
Traditional Family	Austria	20	4
	Belgium	19	-
	France	36	9
	Germany	30	8
	Netherlands	21	-
	Italy	38	-

Note.— Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix I.

TABLE 7
 OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND HOMEMAKERS,
 BY TYPE OF FAMILY POLICY MODELS (AROUND 2000).
 (D = INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY; A = CHARLES – GRUSKY INDEX OF ASSOCIATION)

Type of Family Policy Model		Occupational Segregation		Homemakers
		D	A	(%)
Earner – Carer	Denmark	48	5.1	2
	Finland	52	5.6	7
	Norway	48	5.2	7
	Sweden	48	5.2	6
Market Oriented	USA	41	4.2	13
	United Kingdom	46	5.5	10
	Ireland	48	5.4	25
	Switzerland	48	4.5	21
Traditional Family	Austria	44	4.6	19
	Belgium	47	4.8	15
	France	44	3.2	10
	Germany	48	4.1	13
	Italy	36	3.5	24
	Netherlands	47	5.4	13

Note.—Sources: Cf. Methodological Appendix E and F.

REFERENCES

- Albrecht, James, Anders Björklund and Susan Vroman. 2003. "Is There a Glass Ceiling in Sweden?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 21:145-177.
- Arulampalam, Wiji, Alison L Booth, and Mark L Bryan. 2007. "Is There a Glass Ceiling Over Europe? Exploring the Gender Gap Across the Wage Distribution." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 60:163-186.
- Atkinson, Anthony B. 2004. "The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS): past, present and future." *Socio-Economic Review* 2:165-190.
- Atkinson, Anthony B. and Thomas Piketty. 2007. *Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bäckman, Olof, and Tommy Ferrarini. 2010. "Combating Child Poverty? A Multilevel Assessment of Links Between Family Policy Institutions in 20 countries." *Journal of Social Policy* 39:275-296.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Björklund, Anders. 2006. "Does Family Policy Affect Fertility?" *Journal of Population Economics* 19:3-24.
- Booth, Alison L. 2006. "The Glass Ceiling in Europe: Why Are Women Doing Badly in the Labour Market?" Paper presented for the Economic Council of Sweden, Stockholm.
- Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 1996. "Wage Structure and Gender Earnings Differentials. An International Comparison." *Economica*, 63:29-62.
- , 2003. "Understanding International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 21:106-144.
- Castles, Francis G. 1985. *The Working Class and Welfare*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Charles, Maria and David B. Grusky. 2004. *Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.
- Crompton, Rosemary. 2006. *Employment and the Family. The Reconfiguration of Work and Family Life in Contemporary Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Daly, Mary, and Jane Lewis. 1999. "Introduction: Conceptualising Social Care in the Context of Welfare State Restructuring." Pp. 1-25 in *Gender, Social Care and Welfare State Restructuring in Europe*, ed. Jane Lewis. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Datta Gupta, Nabanita, Nina Smith, and Mette Verner. 2008. "The Impact of Nordic Countries' Family Friendly Policies on Employment, Wages, and Children." *Review of the Economics of the Household* 6:65-89.
- Duncan, Otis Dudley and Beverly Duncan 1955. "A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes." *American Sociological Review* 20:210-217.
- England, Paula. 1992. "From Status Attainment to Segregation and Devaluation." *Contemporary Sociology* 21:643-646.
- England, Paula. 2002. *Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- England, Paula. 2005. "Gender Inequality in Labor Markets: The Role of Motherhood and Segregation." *Social Politics* 12:264-288.
- England, Paula and Nancy Folbre. 1999. "The Cost of Caring." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 561:39-51.

- England, Paula, Michelle Budig, and Nancy Folbre. 2002. "The Wages of Virtues: The Relative Pay of Care Work." *Social Problems* 49:455-73.
- Esping-Andersen, Gösta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Ferrarini, Tommy. 2006. *Families, States and Labour Markets: Institutions, Causes and Consequences of Family Policy in Post-War Welfare States*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Fraser, Nancy. 1994. "After the Family Wage. Gender Equity and the Welfare State." *Political Theory* 22:591-618.
- Ganzeboom, Harry B.G., Treiman, Donald J., "International Stratification and Mobility File: Conversion Tools" <http://home.fsw.vu.nl/hbg.ganzeboom/ismf>.
- Glucksmann, Miriam. 2000. *Cottons and Casuals: The Gendered Organization of Labour in Time and Space*. Cavendish: Routledge.
- Goldstein, Harvey. 2003. *Multilevel Statistical Models*, 3rd edition. Kendall's Library of Statistics 3. London: Arnold.
- Gornick, Janet C., Marcia K. Meyers, and Katherin E. Ross. 1997. "Supporting the Employment of Mothers: Policy Variation Across Fourteen Welfare States." *Journal of European Social Policy* 7:45-70.
- . 1998. "Public Policies and the Employment of Mothers: A Cross-National Study." *Social Science Quarterly* 79:35-54.
- . 2008. Creating Gender Egalitarian Societies: An Agenda for Reform. *Politics & Society* 36:313
- Gornick, Janet C., and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. *Families that Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Gornick, Janet C. and Jerry A. Jacobs. 1998. "Gender, the Welfare State, and Public Employment: A Comparative Study of Seven Industrialized Countries." *American Sociological Review* 63:688-710.
- Hernes, Helga Maria. 1987. *Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Hicks, Alexander, and Lane Kenworthy. 2003. "Varieties of Welfare Capitalism." *Socio-Economic Review* 1:27-61.
- Hiilamo, Heiki, and Olli Kangas. 2009. "Trap for Women or Freedom to Choose? The Struggle over Cash for Child Care Schemes in Finland and Sweden." *Journal of Social Policy* 38: 457-475.
- Hobson, Barbara. 2005. "Feminist Theorizing and Feminisms in Political Sociology." Pp. 135-152 in *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, edited by T. Janoski, R. R. Alford, A. M. Hicks and M. A. Schwartz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, Barbara. and Mieko Takahashi. 1997. "The parent-worker model: lone mothers in Sweden", in Lewis J. (ed), *Lone mothers in European welfare regimes: Shifting policy logics*, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Hox, Joop. 2002. *Multilevel analysis: Techniques and Applications*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Huber, Evelyn, and John Stephens. 2001. *Development and Crises of the Welfare State: Parties and Politics in Global Markets*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Huber, Evelyn, John D. Stephens, David Bradley, Stephanie Moller, and Francois Nielsen. 2009. "The Politics of Women's Economic Independence." *Social Politics*, 16:1-39.

- Hultin, Mia. 2001. *Consider Her Adversity: Four Essays on Gender Inequality in the Labor Market*. Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, Stockholm.
- Johansson, Sten. 1970. *Om Levnadsnivåundersökningen*. Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget.
- . 1973. "The Level of Living Survey: A Presentation." *Acta Sociologica* 16:211-19.
- Kenworthy, Lane. 2003. *Jobs with Equality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Korpi, Tomas, and Lotta Stern. 2004. "Kvinna i Karriären – Kön, Familj och Karriär 1950-2000". Pp 226- 248 in *Familj och Arbete – Vardagsliv i Förändring* edited by M. Bygren, M. Gähler and M. Neramo. Stockholm: SNS förlag.
- Korpi, Walter. 2000. Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States. *Social Politics* 7:127-191.
- . 2006. Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism. *World Politics* 58:167-206.
- Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. 1998. "The Paradox of Redistribution and the Strategy of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries." *American Sociological Review* 63:661-87.
- Koven, Seth, and Sonya Michel. 1993. *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States*. New York: Routledge.
- le Grand, Carl, Ryszard Szulkin, and Michael Thålin. 2001a. "Lönestrukturens Förändring i Sverige." Pp. 121-173 in *Välfärd och Arbete i Arbetslöshetens Årtionde*, edited by J. Fritzell, M. Gähler and O. Lundberg. Stockholm: SOU (2001:53).
- . 2001b. "Har jobben blivit bättre?" Pp. 79- 120 in *Välfärd och arbete i arbetslöshetens årtionde*, edited by J. Fritzell, M. Gähler and O. Lundberg. Stockholm: SOU (2001:53).
- Leira, Arnlaug. 1992. *Welfare States and Working Mothers: The Scandinavian Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2006. "Parenthood Change and Policy Reforms in Scandinavia, 1970-2000s." In *Politicising Parenthood in Scandinavia*, edited by A. L. Ellingsæter and L. Arnlaug. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Lewis, Jane. 1992. "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes." *Journal of European Social Policy* 2:159-73.
- . 1993. "Women, Work, Family and Social Policies in Europe." Pp. 1-24 in *Women and Social Policies in Europe*, edited by J. Lewis. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Lewis, Jane, and Susanna Guillari. 2005. "The Adult Worker Model Family, Gender Equality and Care: the Search for New Policy Principles and the Possibilities and Problems of a Capabilities Approach." *Economy and Society* 34:76-104.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1975. "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research." *Comparative Political Studies* 8:158-77.
- Löfström, Åsa. 2004. Könnssegregeringens olika Dimensioner. Chapter 2 in *Den könsuppdelade arbetsmarknaden* SOU 2004:43. Stockholm: Fritzes
- Mair, Peter. 1996. "Comparative Politics: An Overview" Pp. 309–335 in *A New Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Goodin, Robert E.; Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mandel, Hadas, and Moshe Semyonov. 2005. "Family Policy, Wage Structures, and Gender Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 Countries." *American Sociological Review*, 70: 949-967.
- . 2006. "A Welfare State Paradox: State Interventions and Women's Employment Opportunities in 22 Countries." *American Journal of Sociology*, 111:1910-49.

- Mandel, Hadas and Michael Shalev. 2009. "How Welfare States Shape the Gender Pay Gap: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 87:1873-1912.
- Misra, Joya, Michelle J. Budig, and Stephanie Moller. 2007. "Work-Family Policies and Poverty for Partnered and Single Women in Europe and North America." *Gender & Society* 21:804-827.
- Montanari, Ingalill. 2000. "From Family Wage to Marriage Subsidy and Child Benefits: Controversy and Consensus in the Development of Family Support." *Journal of European Social Policy* 10:307-33.
- Morgan, Kimberly J. 2008. "The Political Path to a Dual Earner/Dual Carer Society: Pitfalls and Possibilities." *Politics & Society* 36:403-420.
- Morgan, Laurie A. 1998. "Glass Ceiling or Cohort Effects? A Longitudinal Study of the Gender Earnings Gap for Engineers, 1982 to 1989." *American Sociological Review* 63:479-494.
- Ministry of Social Affairs. 2001. *The Welfare of Children and Youth*, SOU 2001:55. Stockholm: Welfare Audit Committee.
- Mjøset, Lars, and Tommy. H. Clausen (eds.). 2007. *Comparative Social Research*. New York: JAI Press.
- Neyer, Gerda, and Gunnar Andersson. 2008. "Consequences of Family Policies on Childbearing Behavior: Effects or Artifacts?" *Population and Development Review* 34:699-724.
- Nordberg, Leif, Pettilä, Irmeli, and Sandtröm, Susanna. 2001. "A study on the effects of using interview versus register data in income distribution analysis with an application to the Finnish ECHP-survey in 1996." CHINTEX WP 5 Working Paper 1. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
- Norris, Pippa. 1987. *Politics and Sexual Equality: The Comparative Position of Women in Western Democracies*. Boulder: Rienner and Wheatsheaf.
- Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Organization for Economic and Cultural Development. 2007. *Babies and Bosses. Reconciling Work and Family Life: A Synthesis of Findings for OECD Countries*. Paris: OECD.
- O'Connor, Julia S. 1993. "Gender, Class, and Citizenship in the Comparative Analysis of Welfare State Regimes." *British Journal of Sociology* 44:501-18.
- . 1996. "From Women in the Welfare State to Gendering Welfare State Regimes." *Current Sociology* 44:1-124.
- O'Connor, Julia S., Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver. 1999. *States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oláh, Livia, and Eva Bernhardt. 2008. "Sweden: Combining Childbearing and Gender Equality." *Demographic Research* 19:1105-1144.
- Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development. 2001, 2002, 2004. *Employment Outlook*. Paris: OECD.
- Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship – The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States." *American Sociological Review* 58: 303-328.
- . 1996. "Gender in the Welfare State." *Annual Review of Sociology* 22: 51-78.

- Pateman, Carole. 1989. *The Disorder of Women. Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Pedersen, Susan. 1993. *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State - Britain and France, 1914-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pope Paul VI. 1971. *Octogesima Adveniens*. The Vatican.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, and Skrondal, Anders. 2008. *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata (Second Edition)*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.
- Ragin, Charles C. 1994. *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Reskin, Barbara, and Irene Padavic. 1994. *Women and Men at Work*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Rostgaard, Tine. 2002. Caring for Children and Older People in Europe- a Comparison of European Policies and Practice, *Policy Studies*, 23:51-68.
- Roybeyns, Ingrid. 2005. "The capability approach: a theoretical survey." *Journal of Human Development* 6:93-114.
- Sainsbury, Diane. 1996. *Gender Equality and Welfare States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, Amartya. 1992. *Inequality Re-examined*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shalev, Michael. 2007. "Limits and Alternatives to Multiple Regression in Comparative Research." *Comparative Social Research* 24: 261-308.
- . 2008. Class Divisions among Women. *Politics and Society* 36:421-444
- Siim, Birte, 2000. *Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skolverket. 2010. *Barn och personal i förskola hösten 2009*. Stockholm: Skolverket Enheten för utbildningsstatistik.
- Snijders, Tom A. B., and Roel J. Bosker. 1999. *Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling*. London: Sage.
- Stephens, John D. 1979. *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism*. London: Macmillan.
- Tingsten, Herbert. 1937. *Political Behaviour. Studies in Election Statistics*. London: P. S. King & Son.
- Visser, Jelle, and Daniele Checchi. 2009. "Inequality and the Labor Market: Unions." Pp. 230-256 in Salwerda, Wiemer, Brian Nolan and Timothy M. Smeeding (Editors). /The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality/. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vogel, Ursula. 1991. "Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?" Pp. 55-85 in *The Frontiers of Citizenship*, edited by Ursula Vogel and Michael Moran. London: Macmillan.
- Waldfoegel, Jane. 2002. "Child Care, Women's Employment, and Child Outcomes." *Journal of Population Economics* 15:527-548.
- Waldfoegel, Jane. 2004. "Welfare Reform and the Child Welfare System." *Child and Youth Services Review* 26:919-939.
- Wright, Erik Olin, Janeen Baxter, and Gun Elisabeth Birkelund. 1995. "The Gender Gap in Workplace Authority: A Cross National Study." *American Sociological Review* 60: 407-435.