

Working Mothers and the State: How to Explain the Cross-Government Variation in Maternal Employment Supporting Policies?

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Abstract

Over the last years, the level of spending on maternal employment supporting policies has risen in most countries. The variation across governments in this level remains substantial though. How to account for this variation? Drawing on the critical mass literature, we argue that empirically show that a critical mass of at least 15 per cent of women legislators is necessary for high levels of spending on an important maternal employment supporting policy: parental leave benefits. We test this hypothesis with a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of the governments from 12 OECD countries between 1980 and 2003 ($n = 55$). The analysis shows that a critical mass of women legislators is indeed necessary for high levels of spending on parental leave benefits. This condition is not sufficient, though. The presence of corporatism, low economic openness, high economic growth and leftist partisanship or rightist partisanship are INUS conditions – Individually Nonredundant (that is, Necessary) part of a Unnecessary but Sufficient (combination of) condition(s) – for high levels of spending on these benefits.

By assessing the influence of a critical mass of women, and other conditions, on an important policy supporting the level of maternal employment, this study contributes to the comparative welfare state literature in general and the literature on new social risks in particular.

Key words: welfare state; maternal employment; parental leave; governments' policy-making; critical mass theory; fsQCA

Introduction¹

Over especially the last decade, we have witnessed an influx of studies addressing the variation across countries and/or over time in maternal employment supporting policies, such as parental leave benefits or child care (e.g. Lewis 1992; Sainbury 2001; Clasen 2005: chapter 6; Lambert 2008; Kittilson 2008; Atchison and Down 2009; Morgan 2009; Bonoli and Reber 2010).² This scholarly attention is hardly surprising, as in spite of the “context of permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001) in which contemporary welfare states find themselves, many countries have expanded rather than retrenched policies supporting the employment of women. Given the tight budgets governments everywhere face, this is a puzzling phenomenon warranting an explanation. The literature on new social risks (NSRs) offers a compelling account of why expansions in maternal employment supporting policy make sense: the transformation to a post-industrial society has brought to the fore “new” social risks, such as changing family structures and increased participation of women on the labour market. Hereby post-industrialization pushes for the development of policies catering to these NSRs (see Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). Maternal employment supporting policies are a perfect candidate in this respect, among other factors because they can facilitate the combination of work and care. We have also evidence that the returns on for instance family policy are excellent. Esping-Andersen (2009: 96) shows that the net return to the exchequer of five years pre-school day-care provision amounts to no less than € 37,150 for a mother earning 67 per cent of average wages.³ Research also shows that policies like childcare services and (long) paid maternal leave yield the (desired) effect of higher women labour participation (e.g. Gornick et al. 1996, 1997; Mandel and Semyonov 2006).

Against this backdrop, policies supporting working mothers thus seem a win-win situation. Consequently, we would expect high levels of policies supporting mothers to work – like paternal leave benefits – in all advanced democracies. This is not the case. Whilst some governments, like the Nyrup Rasmussen cabinets in Denmark, display high levels of public and mandatory private cash parental leave benefits, other governments such as the Dutch Lubbers and Kok cabinets do not (Armingeon et al.

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² Our use of the term *maternal* employment supporting policies is not normative in the sense that we think policies should cater to mothers while the fathers are left out of the equation. However, in reality, in most families it is the mother that will work more hours because of such policies since the father typically (already) has a full-time job.

³ Specifically, Esping-Andersen shows that the expenditure of € 72,850 on day-care leads to a gross life course wage gain for the mother of € 314,400, which leads to a € 110,000 gain for the exchequer. This results in a net return to the state of € 110,00 minus € 72,850 = € 37,150.

2008). The existing literature provides no conclusive account for this puzzling finding. For instance, the body of work focusing on welfare state regime differences (e.g. Lewis 1992; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Morel 2007; Lewis 1992) cannot explain the large differences *within* welfare state regimes (cf. Sainsbury 1999a, 2001; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1999; O'Connor 1999). This paper addresses the lacuna in the literature by examining the conditions relating to spending on an important policy supporting maternal employment, namely parental leave.

Based on *critical mass theory* (e.g. Grey 2002, 2006; Thomas 1994, for an overview see Wängnerud 2009: 59-65), our theoretical argument is that a relatively high share of women legislators (at least 15 per cent) is necessary for a high level of parental leave benefits. A critical mass of women legislators is necessary because maternal employment supporting policies are typically not electorally popular since the median voter fails to support it. For example, no less than 61 per cent of the Swiss electorate voted down a proposal for 14 weeks of paid maternity leave (at 80% of the last income) in the late 1990s (Kuebler 2007: 226-227). Also the population pyramids of Western democracies leave room to question these policies' overall popularity (OECD 2007). The percentage of the population between age 25 and 44 – the group benefiting directly from family policy – is somewhere between 26 (Finland) and 31 (Canada) and thus far from a majority. Perhaps even more importantly, the share of population over 45 years of age – typically not benefiting from the policies – is substantially higher. This proportion ranges from an exceptional low of 33 per cent in Ireland to 46 per cent in Italy. These figures indicate that the median voter does not benefit from them. Bonoli and Häusermann (2009) show that this observation likely matters. Based on an analysis of the actual voting behaviour on referendum issues in Switzerland, Bonoli and Häusermann find that the youngest generation (in their case between 18 and 39 years of age) was two or three times (depending on the referendum) more likely to support maternity insurance than the oldest generation of people (65 years or older). Having a large share of women legislators is not enough, though. We propose and empirically show that in addition other factors like leftist partisanship, the presence of corporatism, openness and high economic growth are so-called INUS conditions – Individually Nonredundant (that is, Necessary) part of a Unnecessary but Sufficient (combination of) condition(s) (see e.g. Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

We test our theoretical argument with a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008) on government-level data for 12 OECD countries between 1985 and 2003,⁴

⁴ Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). We focus on these cases because of the availability of qualitative and quantitative data on maternal employment supporting policies. The findings of this study pertain to these cases only, although we argue that the main result – the importance of the share of women in parliament – holds for other advanced democracies too, like Austria or New Zealand. The time period between 1985 and 2003 is also

amounting to 55 cases. FsQCA is particularly apt for identifying necessary and/or sufficient (combinations of) conditions that lead towards the outcome or its absence and is therefore apt for testing our central hypotheses.

The study's main contribution is demonstrating under which conditions governments display high levels of public and private mandatory cash parental leave benefits. A second, related, contribution is that this study offers a thorough empirical test of the critical mass hypothesis. Although the idea of a critical mass gained much popularity in recent years, current literature focuses mainly on the theoretical construction of the concept (e.g. Childs and Krook 2006; Dahlerup 2006) instead of testing its empirical effects (for an exception see Grey 2002). Therefore, it remains more a theoretical construct than an empirical finding (Studlar and McAllister 2002: 234).

This paper has the following structure. Section 2 discusses the existing literature and shows why this literature falls short to systematically explain the cross-government variation in maternal employment supporting policies. Section 3 develops our central theoretical argument of the importance of a critical mass of women legislators and the accompanying conditions. Section 4 discusses the operationalization (calibration in fuzzy-set terminology) of the outcome (dependent variable) and causal conditions (independent variables). Section 5 discusses the findings of the fsQCA analysis. The final section deals with this study's implications.

Existing literature

A large part of the current literature on maternal employment supporting policy tries to explain the level or provision of policies that support the employment of mothers (e.g. Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1999a, 2001; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1999; O'Connor 1999; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Regarding the provision of such policies, for example Lewis (1992, 1997) and Sainsbury (1999a, 2001) study the effect of gender regimes. By differentiating between strong male-breadwinner states, modified male-breadwinner states, and weak male-breadwinner states, Lewis (1992, 1997) finds that there is a substantial cross-national difference in policy provision for supporting paid and unpaid labour by women. Strong male-breadwinner states, like Ireland and the UK, provide policies that maximize men's participation to the labour market and minimize women's. Men provide the family income while women take care of the children. Both women's labour market participation and the level of child care and maternal leave policies are low in these countries. In modified male-breadwinner states, like France, social security aims at compensating parents for the costs of their children. By rewarding women for unpaid labour, like child care, also here women's participation in the labour market is low. Finally, weak male-breadwinner

based on the available data. Still, this time period is long enough to capture the change in maternal employment supporting policies that occurred in some of our cases.

states like Sweden both stimulate women's labour market participation and compensate women's unpaid labour as mothers (Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1999a).

With respect to the level or presence of maternal employment supporting policies, some scholars focus on the effect of welfare state regime instead of the gender regime (e.g. Sainsbury 1999a; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1999; O'Connor 1999; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Morel 2007; Bolzendahl 2009). A first cluster of social-democratic countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Norway has generous social benefits and services in general and for supporting maternal employment in particular. These are typically weak male-breadwinner states. Second, there is a group of liberal countries, like the UK, the United States (US) and Australia, which do not provide an extensive system of benefits, neither to support the traditional family, nor to stimulate maternal employment. These are strong male-breadwinner states. Third and finally, there are the conservative-corporatist countries, including Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, where policy provision is directed at supporting the traditional family, that is men as breadwinners and women as caretakers. These countries largely fit the modified male-breadwinner type.

Scholars expect that the type of welfare state regime affects or level of generosity of policies that support the employment of mothers. Mandel and Semyonov (2006), for example, find that social-democratic welfare states are more generous than market-oriented liberal welfare regimes. Others suggest that the type of welfare state does not or just partly explains the variation across countries (Gornick et al. 1996, 1997; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1999; O'Connor 1999; Sainsbury 1999a, 2001). For instance, by comparing Norway and Sweden, Sainsbury (1999a, 2001) seeks to explain why these two Nordic countries differ in terms of policies benefiting women, mothers in particular. According to Sainsbury, maternity benefits in Sweden are more generous than in Norway because the latter had strong ideals about the "domestic mother", that is maternalism was institutionalized. Moreover, Norway did not have the united and cross-class coalition formed by several women's organizations with an interest in the same policies and rights existing in Sweden. These findings reveal that besides differences between the three welfare state regime types, there are substantial differences *within* welfare regimes types. This suggests that welfare state regime cannot (fully) explain the variation between countries in maternal employment supporting policies. The same holds for the gender regimes discussed above; also within these regimes, there is much variation across countries and within countries over time (that is, across governments).

Theory and hypotheses

Critical mass theory

How to account for the variation in the level of maternal employment supporting policies across countries and governments? Based on critical mass theory, our main causal condition is the percentage of women legislators. The idea of a critical mass essentially means that a critical mass of women legislators, ranging from 15 to 40 per cent, should be present in national parliaments before significant women-friendly changes in policies occur, like childcare, right of abortion and generous maternal leaves (e.g. Dahlerup 1988, 2006; Thomas 1994; Bratton and Ray 2002; Grey 2002, 2006, see Wängnerud 2009). There is evidence to suggest that the percentage of women legislators matters. For example, Thomas (1994: 83) argues women legislators are more liberal than men and show a more positive attitude towards women's issues and social welfare issues. Women's voting-behaviour reflects the positive attitudes towards women-friendly policies. Consequently, when a substantial number of women legislators is present in parliament, women's interests should be better catered for. Thomas shows that women also more often initiate women-friendly policies dealing with childcare and social welfare issues than male politicians. Additionally, women-friendly policies initiated by women legislators pass more often in parliament than similar policies initiated by men. Related, Bratton and Ray (2002) and Kittilson (2008) find a positive relation between the number of women legislators and childcare policy. However, Kittilson (2008: 332) notes that increasing the number of women in parliament alone is not sufficient to stimulate the adoption of women-friendly policies. Other factors like women's movements and organizations are also important in order to get women's issues on the policy agenda. Focusing on total social spending, Bolzendahl (2009) demonstrates a significant positive effect of women legislators and suggest that women's representation could be a potential mechanism for translating changing gender relations to more women-friendly policies. Similarly, Lambert (2008) shows that the percentage of women in parliaments is both significantly and positively related to maternal employment policies. Additionally, the number of women legislators significantly affects the generosity of maternal employment policies.

Our focus on parental leave as an important policy among maternal employment supporting policies warrants an explanation, as it is uncommon in the literature to concentrate exclusively on parental leave. Most studies instead centre on childcare (e.g. Bonoli and Reber 2010), childcare and maternity leave (e.g. Eliason et al. 2008; Hicks and Kenworthy 2008) or a broader range of family-friendly policies (e.g. Kittilson 2008; Lambert 2008; Misra and Jude 2008; Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2009). Notwithstanding the value of these studies, there are reasons to suggest that parental leave is indeed a crucial policy shaping mothers' decisions regarding work and care (see e.g. Erjnæs 2008). Parental leave, which is many countries comes *de facto* still down to maternal leave, is interesting because it has two possible effects on maternal employment that are at least to some extent conflicting. Parental leave could spur

maternal employment but facilitating the combination between work and care. However, parental leave when in fact being maternal leave strengthens the traditional gender-division on work and care and may consequently endanger the future careers of mothers (see also Morgan 2008). We think there are stronger grounds to expect a positive effect of parental leave of women's employment, based on a recent study by Bergemann and Riphahn (2009). Interested in the causal effect of the 2007 reform in Germany that allows the parents of newborns (*Elterngeld*) a high level of parental leave benefits for a maximum of one year, Bergemann and Riphahn analysis of the German Socio-Economic Panel shows that this reform increases the speed with which mothers re-enter the labour market.

Although the idea of a critical mass has by some scholars been rejected because of lack of evidence (see Dahlerup 2006; Childs and Krook 2006), the findings discussed above reveal that a critical mass is likely crucial for women-friendly policy outputs and social spending. Therefore, we expect that a critical mass of female legislators is necessary for a high level of maternal employment supporting policies, like parental leave benefits. Additionally, because many scholars suggest that the presence of a critical mass of female legislators is in itself insufficient for women-friendly policy outcomes to occur we hypothesize that

Critical mass hypothesis: The presence of a critical mass of female legislators is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for high spending on parental leave benefits.

Leftist partisanship

A critical mass alone is not enough to bring about a high level of maternal employment supporting policies, we propose. Let us therefore address four other conditions that we expect to be INUS conditions, that is an Insufficient but Nonredundant (i.e. Necessary) part of a Unnecessary but Sufficient (combination of) condition(s). As Mahoney and Goertz (2006: 232) explain, 'an INUS cause is one cause within a combination of causes that are jointly sufficient for an outcome'. What scholars seek for using an INUS approach, are 'combinations of variable values [conditions] that are sufficient for outcomes of interest' (idem).

A first condition that we expect to be an INUS condition is *leftist partisanship*. If partisanship matters, cabinet composition shapes the type of social policies implemented (e.g. Korpi and Palme 2003). Most scholars agree that leftist parties and rightist ones differ with respect to their objectives regarding socio-economic policies. However, the literature is inconclusive if and how the partisan composition of cabinets affects spending on maternal employment supporting policies. For example, Sainsbury (1999b: 268) finds that, in general, leftist parties are more committed to gender equality as a policy goal than rightist parties are (see also Huber and Stephens 2001). Additionally, the presence of Christian democ-

atic parties in cabinet has a negative bearing on gender-equality policies because of these parties' traditional beliefs about family (Sainsbury 1999b: 269). Bolzendahl (2009) also finds that, in combination with the percentage of women legislators, leftist parties have a positive effect on social spending. Others, like Sainsbury (1999a) show that leftist partisanship does not necessarily mean generous provision of family policies and services (see also Seeleib-Kaiser, Van Dyk and Roggenkamp 2008). Since the late 1960s, in both Norway and Sweden the social democrats dominated the executive as government party for approximately the same number of years. Still, as we discussed above, both countries differed substantially in the provision of maternal employment supporting policies. This suggests that partisan composition cannot (fully) explain generous expenditures on maternal employment supporting policies. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis

Partisanship hypothesis: Leftist partisanship is an INUS condition for high spending on parental leave benefits.

Presence of corporatism

A second hypothesized INUS condition for high spending on parental leave benefits is *the presence of corporatism*. There is no consensus on the definition of what corporatism exactly is. For example, Siaroff (1999: 177) indicates as core features of corporatism 'the co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of the national economy by the state, centralised unions, and employers (...)'. Differently, Baccaro (2003: 683) proposes a broader definition of corporatism as 'a particular structure of the interest representation system, characterized by monopolistic, centralized and internally non-democratic associations'. We measure corporatism as the degree of coordination of wage bargaining (Kenworthy 2001). The reasoning behind this is that the more coordinated wage bargaining, the more likely and plausible that government and social partners can come to coordinated action with respect to economic performance. We use the Kenworthy-index since, to our knowledge, it is the only index showing variation on an annual basis, hence able to capture changes in a country's degree of corporatism.⁵ Findings show that corporatism relates positively to women-friendly policies (Kittilson 2008; see also O'Connor 1999; Lambert 2008). Labour unions can be, and often are, used as platforms to bargain in favour of improving policies and services that support maternal employment (Sainsbury 1999b; see also Martin and Swank 2004). Moreover, O'Connor (1999) also shows that the level of unionization matters for the provision of maternal employment supporting policies (see also Sainsbury 1999b, 2001). When (labour) un-

⁵ Other dynamic scales of corporatism include Siaroff (1999) and Traxler (2004). However, the former is less useful because it displays only the variation per decade and the latter because it only presents modal rates over 4-year periods. Furthermore, both indices are complex and based on a different conceptualization of corporatism than we adopt here.

ions are used as platforms to get women-friendly issues on the policy agenda, the presence of women legislators matters in the decision-making process and especially in the adoption of such policies, that is in the agenda-setting process (see also O'Connor 1999: 68; Sainsbury 1999b: 268). However, we expect that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for high levels of maternal employment policy expenditures. Therefore, we hypothesize that

Corporatism hypothesis: The presence of corporatism is an INUS condition for high spending on parental leave benefits.

High economic openness

Since the literature on other social policy areas, like active labour market policy, show that corporatism matters for policy output in combination with or in addition to economic openness (e.g. Martin and Swank 2004; Armingeon 2007), we also include a *high degree of openness* among our conditions. Because of international economic competition, open economies cannot afford high social expenditures on generous programmes (see also Armingeon 2007: 924). Consequently, one might expect a negative effect of economic openness on governmental spending on maternal employment supporting policies. However, because of international competition, it might also be important to increase employment rates. In that case, economic openness would lead to higher levels of spending on supporting policies to increase women's participation in the labour force. Current literature on maternal employment provides no cues on the effect of economic openness. Because there are so far no findings to indicate if and how economic openness affects governmental spending on maternal employment supporting policies, we hypothesize the following.

Economic openness hypothesis: A high degree of economic openness is an INUS condition for high spending on parental leave benefits.

High economic growth

A last condition that we include is *high economic growth*. The amount of economic growth influences how much governments can afford to spend on social policy. Specifically, high economic growth enables governments to spend more on maternal employment supporting policies, whereas low economic growth or even a decreasing economic growth does not leave much room for generous expenditures (see also Bolzendahl 2009; Kittilson 2008). However, like for openness, the current literature on maternal employment lacks any cues on the effect of economic growth. Since there are no findings so far to

indicate whether economic growth indeed affects the level of expenditures on maternal employment supporting policies, we hypothesize the following.

Economic growth hypothesis: High economic growth is an INUS condition for high spending on parental leave benefits.

Calibration

Outcome

This study's indicator for the level of spending on maternal employment supporting policies is total public and mandatory private cash benefits on maternal and parental leave as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), taken from Armingeon and colleagues' (2008) Comparative Political Data Set I. Table WA1 in the Web Appendix presents the raw data for spending on parental leave benefits. The table also includes some background information on the cabinets, specifically their country and period in office. Table WA1 indicates that there is ample variation across countries. For example, all Swedish governments have high levels of expenditures, whereas the Australian cabinets have very low levels of spending on maternal and parental leaves. The table also reveals interesting variation across governments. While most Norwegian governments have high levels of spending, Harlem Brundtland 2 has a substantially lower level of expenditures. Because of the variation across governments within countries and between countries in the level of spending on parental leave benefits, we take governments as our unit of analysis. Such an approach is still rare in comparative welfare state research (exceptions include Armingeon and Giger 2008; Giger and Nelson forthcoming; Schumacher et al. 2010). Still, decision-making about social policy takes place within governments. Therefore, to know what cabinets do, one needs to study cabinets instead of the typically used alternatives like countries or country-year.

To allow for fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we need to transform (calibrate) the raw data into fuzzy-sets. Fuzzy-sets are continuous variables that are purposefully calibrated using theoretical and substantial knowledge and which indicate a degree of set-membership (Ragin 2000: 162). A fuzzy-set includes two qualitative breakpoints, 1 (fully in the set, that is full set-membership) and 0 (fully out of the set, full non-membership). The crossover point of a fuzzy-score (.5) indicates that a government is neither in nor out of the set (here: high spending on parental leave) (Ragin 2009: 90; 2000). Because in fuzzy-set applications establishing these breakpoints and the in-between scores is important (Ragin 2000, 2008), let us discuss the procedure. Based on substantive knowledge of the policies, which derives from among others Clearinghouse (2010), Atchison and Down (2009), ILO (2009), Kittilson (2008), Lambert (2008), MISSOC (2006) and Gornick et al. (1997), we calibrate these data as follows. We place the first qualitative breakpoint 1 (fully in the set PARENTAL LEAVE) at 2 per cent of GDP. The second quali-

tative breakpoint 0 (fully out of the set) is placed at 0 per cent. We place the crossover point .5 (neither in nor out of the set) at 1 per cent. To calibrate the in-between scores, we use the direct method of calibration to create a continuous fuzzy-set (Ragin 2008: chapter 5). This method is the most appropriate way to transform an interval-scale variable, which we have, into a fuzzy-set. The direct method of calibration uses estimates of the log odds of full membership (Ragin 2008: 87-94) and is thus no linear transformation of the raw, interval data. The calibrate command in the fsQCA 2.5 software gives the resulting fuzzy-set.⁶ Table WA2 in the Web Appendix displays the fuzzy-set scores for the outcome, as well as for the five causal conditions of which we discuss the calibration next.

Conditions

Based on the hypotheses presented above, we construct five causal conditions: critical mass of female legislators, leftist partisanship, high corporatism, high economic openness, and high economic growth. Like for the outcome, the raw data need to be transformed into fuzzy-sets. Let us discuss the procedure per condition.

For establishing the fuzzy-set *critical mass of female legislators* (CRIT_MASS), we focus on the number of women in parliament. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the exact level at which a critical mass for women occurs (Studlar and McAllister 2002: 235). Current literature varies from a critical mass of 15 per cent of women legislators to a critical mass of 40 per cent (see Wängnerud 2009). Dahlerup (2006: 520) argues that a large critical mass is not important for reaching desired policy outcomes. Under the right circumstances, even a small percentage of women legislators could be able to make major changes. Grey (2006: 94) suggests that different critical masses might be necessary, depending on the desired outcome. Because current findings indicate a critical mass effect at 15 per cent and higher (e.g. Grey 2002), we place the cross-over point of .5 (neither in nor out of the set CRIT_MASS) at 15 per cent of women legislators. The qualitative breakpoint of 1, that is fully in the set CRIT_MASS, is placed at the level of 40 per cent female legislators, the highest threshold of a critical mass indicated in the literature. The other qualitative breakpoint 0 (fully out of the set CRIT_MASS) is placed at 0 per cent of women legislators. Like for the outcome, we use the direct method of calibration to calibrate the in-between scores.

For the fuzzy-set *leftist partisanship* (LEFT), we focus on leftist cabinet composition, calculated as the percentage of total cabinet posts held by leftist parties, weighted by days (Armingeon et al. 2008). Calibrating this measure into fuzzy-sets, a score of 100 per cent turns into a fuzzy-score of 1, that is fully in the set of leftist partisanship, and a score of 0 per cent into a fuzzy-score of 0, meaning fully out of

⁶ The software is available at www.compass.org.

the set of leftist partisanship. We place the crossover point .5 (neither in nor out of the set LEFT) at 50 per cent and, again, use the direct method of calibration for the in-between scores.

For the fuzzy-set *high corporatism* (CORP), we use an indicator that measures the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, based on Kenworthy's (2001) classification (see also Visser 2009). We place the first qualitative breakpoint 0 (fully out of the set CORP) at 1. Countries that score '1' in this classification are characterized by fragmented wage bargaining, which mostly takes place at the firm-level and thus does not represent a corporatist system. The second qualitative breakpoint 1 (fully in the set CORP) is placed at 5. Countries that score '5' in this classification are characterized by centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation (Kenworthy 2001), which is typical of a corporatist system. The corporatism variable is recoded into a continuous variable. The procedure is as follows. First, all raw data below or above the qualitative breakpoints, that is <1 and >5 , are recoded as follows (see Ragin 2006): lowest through 1, new value 1; 5 through highest, new value 5. The new minimum and maximum are 1 and 5. Then, the fuzzy-set is computed by taking these transformed raw data and subtracting the lower limit (here: 1) from each score and then dividing the result by the [upper limit minus the lower limit], here: $5 - 1 = 4$. In formula: fuzzy-set score = [transformed raw data – lower limit]/[upper limit – lower limit].

Following most studies, we measure *high economic openness* (OPEN) by the sum of import and export, that is total trade, as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Armingeon et al. 2008). Calibrating this measure into a fuzzy-set, a fuzzy-score of 0 (fully out of the set OPEN) is set at 0 per cent of economic openness, that is a fully closed economy. A fuzzy-score of 1 (fully in the set OPEN) is set at 100 per cent of economic openness, that is a fully open economy. We place the crossover point .5 (neither in nor out of the set OPEN) at 50 per cent of economic openness. Like for the conditions CRIT_MASS and LEFT, the direct method is used to calibrate the in-between fuzzy-scores.

Finally, for the fuzzy-set *high economic growth* (GDPGR) we use the change in the level of economic growth during a cabinet period (Armingeon et al 2008). We focus on the change in growth since previous research suggests that it is not so much the level of socio-economic conditions like growth that make governments act, but the changes therein (e.g. Vis 2010). The first qualitative breakpoint 1 (fully in the set GDPGR) is placed at plus 5 per cent. The second qualitative breakpoint 0 (fully out of the set GDPGR) is placed at minus 5 per cent. Substantial knowledge about developed democracies indicates that a reduction (or increase) of economic growth of 5 per cent is unusual and has a significant impact on the possibilities for socio-economic policy making. The crossover point .5 (neither in nor out of the set GDPGR) is placed at 0. The in-between scores are calibrated with the direct method.

Method and findings

After having discussed our hypotheses and the calibration of the outcome and causal conditions, let us now turn to the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify the conditions for high levels of spending on parental leave benefits. The fsQCA analysis consists of three steps, conducted with fsQCA 2.5 software.

First, we conduct an analysis of necessary conditions. The necessity of conditions should be identified in a separate analysis, which comes prior to the sufficiency analysis (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 404). Table 1 displays the results. A condition is necessary for the outcome when the consistency value is ‘much higher’ than .75 (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 406). Therefore, we set the threshold for necessity at a consistency of at least .9. As table 1 indicates, only a high share of women legislators (i.e. a critical mass of women) has a consistency that meets the necessity threshold (.94). A XY-plot of the outcome and this condition, which figure 1 displays, nicely shows that critical mass is a necessary condition for high spending on parental leave benefits, as almost all cases are located below the 45° diagonal. The necessary condition analysis thus lends support for our hypothesis that a critical mass of women legislators is a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for high spending on parental leave benefits.

--- Table 1 about here ---

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FsQCA Analysis of the Presence of the Outcome

The next step is to find the sufficient (combinations of) conditions, using the so-called truth table algorithm (Ragin 2009: 104). This algorithm transforms the fuzzy-set membership scores into a truth table, using the direct link between the rows of the truth table and the corners of the property space, that is the multidimensional space that includes all logically possible combinations of causal conditions. In this paper, the property space has 2^4 (partisanship, corporatism, openness, growth) (= 16) corners. Truth tables are useful because, among other factors, they reveal the analytical differences and similarities between cases and indicate the degree of diversity in the data, that is, reveal which logically possible combinations of conditions are not observed empirically (Schneider and Grofman 2006: 13). Table WA3 in the Web Appendix displays the truth table.

The subsequent step is to employ Boolean algebra to minimize the truth table. Boolean minimization is the ‘reduction of a long, complex expression into a shorter, more parsimonious expression’ (Rihoux and De Meur 2009: 35). A few conventions of configurational comparative approaches like fsQCA are worth mentioning. Capitals indicate the presence of a condition and lowercases indicate the

absence of a condition. In Boolean and fuzzy-set logic, logical AND or intersection (*) refers to the combination of sets, that is the combination of conditions leading to the outcome. Logical OR or union (+) refers to the union of sets, that is the presence of one of the conditions or both produce the outcome (Rihoux and De Meur 2009: 34-35). For the minimization of the truth table, the researcher needs to decide what level of consistency is high enough to code the outcome as present (see Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 406-407). Because of the drop in the level of consistency between .78 and .75, we code those configurations with a consistency value of .78 and above as present (1) and the rest as absent (0). The truth table (see table WA3) indicates that there are no logical remainders, that is configurations that are logically possible but which do not exist empirically. This means that the complex solution (including no simplifying assumptions), the intermediate solution (including only “easy” counterfactuals) and the parsimonious solution (including all possible simplifying assumptions) are the same. Hence, we present one solution only in table 2. Raw coverage indicates the proportion of cases explained by a particular path (e.g. CORP*left*open). Unique coverage indicates the proportion of cases accounted for by that particular path only. Consistency is the degree to which the fuzzy-set membership scores of all cases in a path (or all paths combined in solution coverage) are sufficient for the outcome (Ragin 2008: chapter 3). Solution coverage indicates the proportion of cases explained by the entire solution, i.e. one or all paths.

--- Table 2 about here ---

The fsQCA analysis in table 2 reveals two paths towards high levels of spending on parental leave benefits: 1) the presence of corporatism AND the absence of leftist partisanship (rightist partisanship) AND the absence of openness OR 2) the presence of corporatism AND leftist partisanship AND high economic growth. In line with the existing literature (e.g. Kittilson 2008; Lambert 2008; O’Connor 1999), the presence of corporatism is relevant for each of the paths, suggesting that corporatism is a sufficient condition for high levels of spending on parental leave benefits – though not as an individual condition but as an INUS one. Different than expected, our analysis shows that leftist partisanship as well as rightist partisanship goes together with high levels of spending on parental leave benefits. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that the rightist government Holkeri 1 displays a high of spending on this policy and that it does the context of a closed economy and in the presence of a corporatist system. Additionally, the leftist governments Harlem Brundtland 3 et al., Lipponen 1, Nyrop Rasmussen 1, N. Rasmussen 2&3, Nyrop Rasmussen 4, and Persson 1&2 have high levels of spending on parental leave benefits and face a corporatist system. Different from the rightist government, the degree of openness of the economy has no bearing on these spending levels but the degree of economic growth does. More precisely, these leftist governments spend (relatively) much on parental leave benefits when the state of

the economy offers the financial room to do so. This indicates that all four conditions are indeed INUS conditions but that the effect of openness and economic growth varies across the political colour of the government. Economic growth has only a bearing on spending on parental leave benefits for leftist governments while openness influences only rightist governments. Different than expected, high economic openness does not yield high spending on parental leave benefits. This indicates that the risk that economic openness limits the room to provide policies that may be required because of post-industrialization. As Armingeon (2007: 924) stated, it seems that open economies cannot afford “luxurious” policies, like parental leave benefits.

Although the above findings make theoretical as well as intuitive sense, let us mention that 5 of the 12 governments with membership $>.5$ to a path do not have a high level of spending on parental leave benefits (Kohl 2 and Kohl 3 in the case of path 1 and Dehaene 1, Dehaene 2 and Hawke 3 for path 2). This suggests that there is a “road block” that hinders high levels of spending on this policy to come about. Although beyond the scope of this paper, future work could examine these case in more depth to assess why despite the “right” combination of conditions, governments do not display high levels of spending on parental leave benefits. It would also be interesting to assess in more detail the common features of the governments that do display high levels of spending on this policy.

FsQCA Analysis of the Negation (Absence) of the Outcome

Finally, it is good practice to also conduct a fsQCA analysis of the negation of the outcome (here: low spending on parental leave benefits) since configurational approaches like fsQCA do not assume causal symmetry (Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Recall that the negation of a fuzzy-set is 1 minus the fuzzy-set score for the presence of the set (e.g., if PARENTAL LEAVE is .8, the negation – parental leave – is .2). Again, we first run a necessary condition analysis (see table 3). Different from the presence of the outcome, none of the conditions is necessary for low levels of spending on parental leave. This finding makes sense given our hypotheses.

--- Table 3 about here ---

Next, we turn to the analysis of the sufficient conditions. Since we identified no necessary conditions, we include all five causal conditions in the analysis. The truth table consists therefore of $2^5 = 32$ rows or configurations, of which 8 have no empirical cases (the logical remainders).⁷ This means that the complex solution, the intermediate one and the parsimonious solution are not the same. In line with Ragin’s (2008) recommendations, we opt for the intermediate solution in which we include the easy

⁷ The truth table is available upon request.

counterfactuals that a critical mass of women legislators needs to be absent for low levels of spending on parental leave benefits and that the government needs to be of rightist composition. Setting the consistency cut-off at .90 – because of the clear break in the level of consistency between .90 and .86 –, the fsQCA analysis finds four paths towards low levels of parental leave benefits (parental leave). Table 4 displays the full fsQCA results.

--- Table 4 about here ---

The results presented in table 4 make immediately clear that there are many more governments with *low* levels of spending on parental leave benefits than there are governments with *high* levels of spending (26 versus 12). Also different from the results of the presence of the outcome (in table 2) is that most governments (14) have membership $>.5$ to more than one of the paths identified. Only Martens 8&9 (path 1), Chrétien 1, Chrétien 2, Chrétien 3, Howard 1, Howard 2, Howard 3 (all path 2), Hawke 4, Rocard 1 et al. (path 3) and Dehaene 1, Dehaene 2 and Jospin (path 4) have membership to one of the paths only. Also different from the analysis of the presence of the outcome, there are no governments with membership $>.5$ to at least one of the path and which do not display a low level of spending on parental leave benefits. The higher coverage and consistency figures for the negation fsQCA analysis are a sign of this.

Theoretically, the findings of the fsQCA analysis of the negation of the outcome are largely in line with those of the presence of the outcome. Most importantly for our argument is that the *absence* of a critical mass of women legislators features in three of the four paths to low spending on parental leave benefits. The absence of a critical mass of women is only a sufficient condition when combined with another condition (the absence of leftist government – that is, rightist government – in path 1, the absence of openness in path 3 and high economic growth in path 4). For the negation of our outcome, the absence of a critical mass of women legislators is thus an INUS condition, just as the conditions with which this condition needs to be combined before it is sufficient are. This makes sense theoretically. If a critical mass of women legislators is necessary for a high level of parental leave benefits, the absence of a critical mass of women should be sufficient – though not necessarily individually so – for the negation of the outcome. This is what the second analysis indeed shows.

Conclusion

Over the last years, most countries have expanded their maternal employment supporting policies, like parental leave benefits, probably in response to the new social risks arising from post-industrialization. However, not all governments display high levels of spending on such policies. The

literature thus far cannot provide a conclusive explanation for when governments have high levels of spending on parental leave benefits and when they do not. This study adds to this discussion by presenting new data for 55 governments in 12 countries between 1980 and 2003. It conducts a fsQCA analysis on these data which reveals the necessary and sufficient conditions for high levels of spending on parental leave benefits. We drew on critical mass theory to argue that the presence of a critical mass of female legislators was necessary for high levels of maternal employment supporting policies. Our necessary condition analysis corroborated this hypothesis, showing that without the presence of a critical mass of women in parliament, it is very unlikely that governments have generous levels of parental leave benefits. With respect to the sufficient conditions, we found two distinct paths towards this outcome: 1) high corporatism combined with rightist partisanship and low economic openness and 2) high corporatism combined with leftist partisanship and high economic growth. To a large extent, these findings are in line with, and extend, existing work. They support existing work by revealing the importance of a critical mass of women legislators, of leftist partisanship and of a corporatist system. The findings furthermore extend current studies by showing that rightist partisanship can also be conducive to high levels of spending on parental leave benefits, that leftist government require financial room to manoeuvre in the form of economic growth and that economic openness only has a bearing on such policies for rightist governments. Our analysis also demonstrated that a high level of spending on parental leave benefits is not easy to achieve, as quite a few governments display the fostering conditions yet not the outcome. Delving in more depth into these cases, as well as in the cases that are “successful” in reaching high levels of spending on this policy, would be an interesting avenue for future research.

The fsQCA analysis of the negation of the outcome, that is to say low levels of spending on parental leave benefits, revealed no necessary conditions – in line with theoretical predictions. It did show that a critical mass of women legislators was a sufficient condition for low levels of spending on parental leave, though not individually so. Also a rightist government in a context of a low degree of corporatism is enough to keep the levels of spending on parental leave benefits low. These results also corroborate existing work and develop it further. Currently, there are more combinations of conditions leading to low levels of spending on parental leave benefits than to high levels of spending. It comes therefore as no surprise that there are also many more governments with low spending than there are with high spending. As one would expect theoretically, it is easier to spend little than to spend a lot.

To sum up, by identifying the conditions under which high and low levels of parental leave arise and by offering a thorough test of the necessity of a critical mass of female legislators, this study made an important contribution to the existing literature.

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Table 1 Necessary condition analysis of high spending on parental leave benefits

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
Women in parliament (CRIT_MASS)	0.94	0.52
Leftist partisanship (LEFT)	0.59	0.51
Corporatism (CORP)	0.77	0.53
Openness (OPEN)	0.88	0.46
Economic growth (GDPGR)	0.76	0.48
Negations		
~Women in parliament (crit_mass)	0.36	0.28
~Leftist partisanship (left)	0.64	0.33
~Corporatism (corp)	0.57	0.35
~Openness (open)	0.50	0.42
~Economic growth (gdpgr)	0.66	0.43

Notes: Capitals indicate the presence of a condition; ~ indicates the negation, that is the absence of a condition, also indicated by lowercase letters. Consistency is the degree to the sub-set relationship of necessity is approximated. Coverage indicates the proportion of membership in the outcome explained by the solution (Ragin 2008: chapter 3).

Table 2 Result of the fsQCA analysis of high spending on parental leave

Solution	CORP*left*open +	CORP*LEFT*GROWTH →	PARENTAL LEAVE
Cases with membership > .5	Kohl 2, Kohl 3, Holkeri 1	H.Brundtland 3 et al., N.Rasmussen 4, Lipponen 1, Dehaene 1, Dehaene 2, Hawke 3, N.Rasmussen 1, N.Rasmussen 2&3, Persson 1&2	
Raw coverage	.32	.39	
Unique coverage	.17	.24	
Consistency	.80	.76	

Solution coverage: .56

Solution consistency: .73

Notes: For explanation of coverage etc., see main text. The cases are listed in the order of degree of membership to the specific path. For example, of the path CORP*left*open, Kohl 2 has the highest degree of membership and Holkeri 1 the lowest.

Table 3 Necessary condition analysis of low spending on parental leave benefits

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
Women in parliament (CRIT_MASS)	.56	.65
Leftist partisanship (LEFT)	.38	.69
Corporatism (CORP)	.48	.70
Openness (OPEN)	.68	.74
Economic growth (GDPGR)	.59	.78
Negations		
~Women in parliament (crit_mass)	.58	.96
~Leftist partisanship (left)	.73	.79
~Corporatism (corp)	.68	.86
~Openness (open)	.50	.90
~Economic growth (gdpgr)	.61	.84


Notes: See table 1.

Table 4 Result of the fsQCA analysis of low spending on parental leave

Solution	crit_mass*left +	corp*left +	crit_mass*open +	crit_mass*GDPGR →	parental leave
Cases with membership > .5	Thatcher 2, Reagan 2, Balladur 1, Juppé 2&1, Thatcher 3&Major1, Chirac 1, Martens 6&7, G.H.W. Bush, Major 2, Clinton 1, Clinton 2, Mulroney 2, G.W. Bush 1, Martens 8&9	G.W. Bush 1, Clinton 2, Clinton 1, Mulroney 2, Chrétien 1, Chrétien 2, Chrétien 3, G.H.W. Bush, Reagan 2, Major 2, Thatcher 2, Thatcher 3&Major 1, Juppé 2&1, Balladur 1, Chirac 1, Howard 3, Howard 2, Howard 1	Reagan 2, G.W.H. Bush, Hawke 3, Hawke 4, Keating 2&3, Clinton 1, Chirac 1, Balladur 1, Rocard 1 et al., Clinton 2, Juppé 2&1, G.W. Bush 1	Balladur 1, Major 2, Thatcher 2, Keating 2&3, Martens 6&7, Dehaene 1, Dehaene 2, Clinton 1, Raegan 2, G.W. Bush 1, Chirac 1, Jospin 1, Hawke 3	
Raw coverage	.45	.56	.41	.43	
Unique coverage	.01	.17	.03	.01	
Consistency	.96	.91	.99	.98	
Solution coverage: .73					
Solution consistency: .92					

Notes: See table 2.

Figure 1 XY-plot critical mass and high spending on parental leave benefits



Web appendix

Table WA1 Total public and private mandatory parental leave cash benefits

Government	Country	Period in office	Spending on parental leave benefits	
Hawke 3	Australia	07/87-04/90	0	
Hawke 4		04/90-12/91	0	
Keating 2 & 3		12/91-03/95	0	
Howard 1		03/96-10/98	0.08	
Howard 2		10/98-11/01	0.07	
Howard 3		11/01-10/04	0.07	
Martens 6 & 7		Belgium	11/85-05/88	0.23
Martens 8 & 9	05/88-03/92		0.35	
Dehaene 1	03/92-06/95		0.48	
Dehaene 2	06/95-07/99		0.45	
Verhofstadt 1	Canada	07/99-07/03	0.48	
Mulroney 2		12/88-11/93	0.34	
Chrétien 1		11/93-06/97	0.34	
Chrétien 2		06/97-11/00	0.27	
Chrétien 3		11/00-12/03	0.46	
Schlüter 4		Denmark	06/88-12/90	0.89
Schlüter 5			12/90-01/93	0.93
N.Rasmussen 1	01/93-09/94		1.35	
N.Rasmussen 2 & 3	Finland	09/94-03/98	1.46	
N.Rasmussen 4		03/98-11/01	1.05	
Holkeri 1		04/87-04/91	1.79	
Aho 1		04/91-04/95	2.70	
Lipponen 1		04/95-04/99	1.68	
Lipponen 2		04/99-04/03	1.23	
Chirac 1		France	03/86-05/88	0.72
Rocard 1 et al.	05/88-03/93		0.85	
Balladur 1	03/93-05/95		0.76	
Juppé 2 & 1	11/95-06/97		0.78	
Jospin 1	Germany	06/97-05/02	0.85	
Kohl 2		01/87-12/90	0.59	
Kohl 3		12/90-10/94	0.64	
Kohl 4		11/94-09/98	0.59	
Schröder 1		10/98-09/02	0.5	
Lubbers 2		Netherlands	07/86-11/89	0.15
Lubbers 3			11/89-08/94	0
Kok 1	08/94-08/98		0	
Kok 2	Norway	08/98-07/02	0	
Harlem Brundtland 2		05/86-10/89	0.69	
Harlem Brundtland 3 et al.		11/90-10/97	1.31	
Bondevik 1		10/97-03/00	1.65	
Stoltenberg 1	Sweden	03/00-10/01	1.63	
Carlsson 2 & 1		03/86-02/90	1.65	
Carlsson 3		02/90-10/91	2.25	
Bildt 1		10/91-10/94	2.29	
Persson 1 & 2		03/96-09/02	1.24	
Thatcher 2	UK	06/86-06/87	0.18	
Thatcher 3 & Major 1		06/87-04/92	0.19	
Major 2		04/92-05/97	0.21	
Blair 1		05/97-06/01	0.18	

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Table WA1 continued

Government	Country	Period in office	Spending on parental leave benefits
Blair 2		06/01-05/05	0.20
Reagan 2	US	01/85-01/89	0
G.H.W. Bush		01/89-01/93	0
Clinton 1		01/93-01/97	0
Clinton 2		01/97-01/01	0
G.W. Bush 1		01/01-01/05	0

Sources: Spending on parental leave benefits: Armingeon et al. (2008). Other variables: Woldendorp et al. (2000); recent years collected by the authors.

Table WA3 Fuzzy-set scores for outcome and the conditions

Government	HIGH SPENDING ON PAREN- TAL LEAVE	LEFTIST PARTISAN- SHIP ^a	CRITICAL MASS OF WOMEN	HIGH CORP ^b	HIGH OPEN NESS ^c	HIGH GROWTH ^d
Hawke 3	0.05	0.95	0.14	0.75	0.26	0.5
Hawke 4	0.05	0.95	0.16	0.75	0.26	0.22
Keating 2 & 3	0.05	0.95	0.20	0.25	0.32	0.71
Howard 1	0.06	0.05	0.51	0.25	0.35	0.7
Howard 2	0.06	0.05	0.71	0.25	0.39	0.41
Howard 3	0.06	0.05	0.77	0.25	0.34	0.49
Martens 6 & 7	0.09	0.05	0.18	1.00	0.99	0.66
Martens 8 & 9	0.12	0.46	0.21	0.75	0.99	0.16
Dehaene 1	0.17	0.55	0.25	0.83	0.99	0.65
Dehaene 2	0.16	0.55	0.37	1.00	1.00	0.75
Verhofstadt 1	0.17	0.58	0.73	0.75	1.00	0.13
Mulroney 2	0.12	0.05	0.42	0	0.56	0.47
Chrétien 1	0.12	0.05	0.59	0	0.80	0.44
Chrétien 2	0.10	0.05	0.66	0	0.89	0.57
Chrétien 3	0.17	0.05	0.66	0	0.84	0.53
Schlüter 4	0.42	0.05	0.87	0.51	0.76	0.47
Schlüter 5	0.45	0.05	0.90	0.51	0.77	0.6
N.Rasmussen 1	0.74	0.62	0.90	0.51	0.76	0.96
N.Rasmussen 2 & 3	0.80	0.83	0.90	0.51	0.79	0.53
N.Rasmussen 4	0.54	0.83	0.94	0.83	0.87	0.65
Holkeri 1	0.91	0.42	0.88	0.63	0.48	0.07
Aho 1	0.91	0.05	0.95	0.63	0.57	1
Lipponen 1	0.88	0.58	0.90	0.75	0.74	0.71
Lipponen 2	0.67	0.51	0.93	0.56	0.78	0.24
Chirac 1	0.30	0.05	0.16	0.25	0.37	0.53
Rocard 1 et al.	0.39	0.77	0.17	0.25	0.41	0.15
Balladur 1	0.33	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.38	0.84
Juppé 2 & 1	0.34	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.42	0.4
Jospin 1	0.39	0.95	0.31	0.25	0.53	0.53
Kohl 2	0.23	0.05	0.51	0.75	0.45	0.93
Kohl 3	0.25	0.05	0.66	0.75	0.47	0.17
Kohl 4	0.23	0.05	0.77	0.75	0.52	0.54
Schröder 1	0.18	0.95	0.87	0.75	0.71	0.27
Lubbers 2	0.07	0.05	0.65	0.75	0.97	0.76
Lubbers 3	0.05	0.49	0.77	0.75	0.97	0.12
Kok 1	0.05	0.30	0.88	0.75	0.98	0.59
Kok 2	0.05	0.35	0.93	0.75	0.99	0.07
H.Brundtland 2	0.28	0.95	0.91	0.92	0.77	0.17
H.Brundtland 3 et al.	0.72	0.95	0.94	0.93	0.78	0.72
Bondevik 1	0.88	0.05	0.93	0.92	0.79	0.31
Stoltenberg 1	0.87	0.05	0.93	0.75	0.82	0.56
Carlsson 2 & 1	0.88	0.95	0.92	0.63	0.68	0.5
Carlsson 3	0.98	0.95	0.94	0.75	0.60	0.21
Bildt 1	0.98	0.05	0.90	0.75	0.65	0.97
Persson 1 & 2	0.67	0.95	0.96	0.51	0.85	0.63
Thatcher 2	0.08	0.05	0.09	0	0.57	0.75
Thatcher 3 & Major 1	0.08	0.05	0.15	0	0.50	0.02
Major 2	0.09	0.05	0.24	0	0.56	0.81
Blair 1	0.08	0.95	0.60	0	0.60	0.33

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Table WA2 continued

Government	HIGH SPENDING ON PAREN- TAL LEAVE	LEFTIST PARTISAN- SHIP ^a	CRITICAL MASS OF WOMEN	HIGH CORP ^b	HIGH OPEN NESS ^c	HIGH GROWTH ^d
Blair 2	0.08	0.95	0.59	0	0.57	0.57
Reagan 2	0.05	0.05	0.13	0	0.13	0.56
G.H.W. Bush	0.05	0.05	0.19	0	0.15	0.44
Clinton 1	0.05	0.05	0.32	0	0.16	0.63
Clinton 2	0.05	0.05	0.41	0	0.18	0.46
G.W. Bush 1	0.05	0.05	0.45	0	0.17	0.76

Note: Cases that are “in” the set of the outcome or a condition (a score > .5) are indicated in **bold**. Cases with exactly .50 membership in either one or more of the conditions or the outcome drop out of the analysis. Therefore, we slightly adjust those cases with .50 membership (see below).

^a Lipponen 2 is coded .51 for gov_left (rather than .50) because the left received most of the votes; Lubbers 3 is coded .49 (instead of .50) because the right received most of the votes.

^b The Danish cabinets are coded .51 for corporatism (rather than .50) because Denmark is more corporatist than not (Teulings & Hartog 1998; Mailand 2006). The same holds for the Swedish cabinet Persson 1 & 2.

^c Thatcher 3 & Major 1 are coded .51 for openness (rather than .50), since it is plausible that the British economy is more open than not.

^d The Swedish cabinet Carlsson 2&1 is coded .49 (rather than .50) for economic growth because of the (looming) crisis; the Australian cabinet Hawke 3 is coded .51 (rather than .50).

Table WA3 Truth table

Conditions				Outcome		
LEFT	CORP	OPEN	GDPGR	PARENTAL LEAVE	Cons	N
0	1	0	1	1	.82	1
0	1	0	0	1	.81	2
1	1	0	1	1	.81	1
1	1	1	1	1	.78	8
1	0	1	1	0	.75	2
1	1	0	0	0	.75	1
1	0	0	0	0	.74	1
1	0	0	1	0	.72	1
1	0	1	0	0	.71	1
0	1	1	1	0	.67	8
1	1	1	0	0	.64	6
0	1	1	0	0	.63	5
0	0	1	1	0	.60	4
0	0	1	0	0	.58	3
0	0	0	0	0	.54	5
0	0	0	1	0	.51	6

Notes: LEFT is the presence of leftist partisanship, CORP is a high degree of corporatism, OPEN is a high degree of openness, GDPGR is high economic growth, PARENTAL LEAVE is high public and private mandatory parental leave cash benefits, cons is the degree of consistency of the specific configuration (i.e. combination of causal conditions), N is the number of cases with >.5 membership to that configuration.