

8th ESPAnet Conference 2010

Social Policy and the Global Crisis: Consequences and Responses

Budapest 2-4 September 2010

Belgium vs. the Netherlands:

Is the crisis a path-breaking or path-reinforcing event?

Preliminary and incomplete draft – please do not cite

Tim Van Rie

Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy

University of Antwerp

tim.vanrie@ua.ac.be

Ive Marx

Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy

University of Antwerp

ive.marx@ua.ac.be

Belgium vs. the Netherlands: Is the crisis a path-breaking or path-reinforcing event?

Abstract

Belgium and the Netherlands provide two of the most compelling contrasting narratives of welfare state reform of the past decades. Both are advanced, small, open economies with similar corporatist concertation and bargaining institutions. Both countries shared similar predicaments of high unemployment around the early 1980s. Their divergence over subsequent decades has been well documented. The Netherlands are often considered as a model reformer, having successfully negotiated the shift from welfare to work, boasting a flexible and modern labour market. By contrast, Belgium is depicted as the prime example of the frozen Bismarckian welfare state. Most sources consider that reform in Belgium (if any) remains incremental and insufficient to effectively cope with the challenges of restructuring and ageing populations.

The first section of the paper provides an overview of this argument, comparing the main policy orientations of Belgium and the Netherlands, over the three previous decades. The main focus is on policy changes triggered by the recessions of the early 1980s and the mid 1990s. This section also considers outcome indicators with regard to labour market and benefit receipt. It argues that the account with regard to reform and labour market outcomes is more nuanced than many would claim. It does confirm however that the Netherlands succeeded much better than Belgium in bringing down benefit dependency.

The second section of the paper considers the recent crisis. It provides an overview of discretionary labour market measures aimed at maintaining or stimulating labour demand and supply (including short time working schemes), at protecting the standard of living of those affected and at ensuring the financial sustainability of the social security system. The section also presents the latest empirical evidence on employment, unemployment and benefit receipt. The conclusion summarizes findings of both sections. It indicates where the trajectories since the latest crisis are consistent with previous decades or rather suggestive of a path-breaking trend.

Key words: welfare state reform, employment, crisis, Belgium, Netherlands

Introduction

Around the mid 1990s, the Continental European welfare states became the subject of strong criticism because of their alleged inertia in the face of fundamental economic and social changes. The critique, most devastatingly spelled out by Esping-Andersen (1996), was that in response to the economic crisis of the early 1970s, the post-industrial transition, skill-biased technological change and the secular rise in female work aspirations, the continental European countries by and large mistakenly opted to maintain the status quo, or at least to try so. This was done in major part through a massive expansion of early retirement and related forms of welfare state facilitated labour shedding in order to absorb excess labour supply. The aim was to avoid mass unemployment and to safeguard the breadwinner model, i.e. high (minimum) wages, strong employment protection and labour market regulations (e.g. limits on temporary and part-time employment), extensive social security rights, primary as well as derived. This route, Esping-Andersen argued, was self-defeatingly costly and to the detriment of employment and longer term welfare state sustainability.

The predicament was labelled 'welfare without work'. Although social policy change was said to be slow and inadequate everywhere, even in countries where politicians portended major overhauls (Pierson, 1994), the continental European welfare states were singled out as being particularly inert or 'frozen'.

Belgium and the Netherlands provide two of the most compelling contrasting narratives of welfare state reform of the past decades. Gauging from the literature, their trajectories over the past decades could hardly have been more different. This is all the more striking because of their many shared features and geographical proximity. Both are advanced, small, open economies with similar corporatist concertation and collective bargaining institutions. In both countries, the social partners play an important role in the governance and administration of social security, be it that that role is more important in Belgium. Both countries shared similar predicaments of high unemployment and benefit dependency around the early 1980s.

The Netherlands is now heralded as an example of radical and successful welfare state reform, towards a better adapted, more modern, sustainable and in effect more Social Democratic type of welfare state. Belgium, by contrast, is usually portrayed as the archetypal frozen welfare state, particularly of the dysfunctional 'conservative' type. And in effect, a 'big reform' account of welfare state change does largely yield this picture (Kuipers, 2006). While the Netherlands successfully undertook major social security and labour market reforms, Belgian attempts to do so failed, the 1994 Social Pact being a prime example.

To this broad stroke picture of Dutch dynamism vs Belgian stalemate, nuance has been added in recent publications. Hemerijck and Marx (2010) claim that Belgium's welfare state did undergo radical change, but that this change happened very gradually, incrementally and effectively by stealth. What they argue, in effect, is that a "big change" account of welfare state change that focuses on major legislative reforms, 'social pacts' etc. change fails to capture the reality of what effectively happened in Belgium, a reality that is altogether more complex than the picture of stalemate. Still, others maintain the view that Belgium's record of welfare state adaptation remains dismal, particularly when compared to the Netherlands (Cox, 2009).

This article sums up this argument and then adopts a resolutely empirical approach, by examining different labour market indicators. The picture this analysis yields is in part consistent with existing accounts of welfare change in both countries, but there are also elements of incongruence with the prevailing narratives.

The article then takes the analysis one step further by considering the impact of the most recent economic and financial crisis. Crises present particularly rich opportunities for path-breaking evolutions. The section considers the main policy orientations of Belgium and the Netherlands, in response to the economic and financial crisis of 2008. It then goes on to investigate whether these represent a break with previous decades.

1. Policy orientations: 1980-2007

Labour costs

In response to the recession of 1982, the Netherlands launched a policy of wage moderation through the 'Wassenaar Akkoord', a now historical agreement between trade unions and employers. While originally instituted as a measure to restore the Dutch economy's competitiveness, a major 'side effect' was strong employment growth. Sustained wage moderation came to be seen as an essential driver of employment growth and activation (Kleinknecht and Naastepad, 2001, OECD 2002). According to Visser and Hemerijck (1997), the Central Planning Bureau estimated that for the second half of the 1980s, a period during which employment growth was particularly strong, two-thirds of job growth could be attributed to wage moderation and one-third to the expansion of the world economy. Wage moderation was by and large maintained throughout the 1990s.

During the late 1990s, the government even started to push employers and unions to effectively use the lowest wage scales laid down in collective agreements – the perceived problem being that low paid (prospective) workers typically got higher wages than the official minimum wage. It did so by threatening to refuse to make sector agreements generally binding unless the lowest wage scales remained near the minimum wage and were more often applied.

While a policy of wage moderation in itself was far from revolutionary, the broad and continued support it enjoyed among social partners and governments of differing composition was remarkable. 'Wassenaar' had reinstated autonomy of the social partners with regard to wage setting (even if the government continued to cast a shadow of hierarchy, Visser and Hemerijck, 1997) ¹.

In the early 1980s, facing a predicament similar to the Netherlands (comparatively high labour costs and competitiveness issues), Belgium also introduced a policy of wage moderation, albeit in a more conflictual manner. Following a significant devaluation of the

¹ http://docs.minszw.nl/pdf/34/2010/34_2010_3_13992.pdf

Belgian franc (1982), and after the social partners had failed to reach an agreement on wages, the Belgian government intervened directly in wage setting. The government widened its competences in this domain, granting itself the right to intervene where the competitiveness of the industry was at stake. After the recession of the mid 1990s, this culminated in the 1996 'Competitiveness of Industry Act' which pre-emptively links wage developments in Belgium to those in the Netherlands, France and Germany. In contrast to the Netherlands, these measures regarding wage developments were not the subject of a broad consensus between social partners. (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996)

A second set of government measures related to the indexation mechanism. Whereas in principle, the 'index' automatically links wages and benefits to price evolutions, this mechanism was put on hold for a number of years in the mid 1980s. After the recession of the middle of the 1990s, the Belgian government proceeded with permanent reform. It introduced the 'health index: from then on, price evolutions of health damaging products (tobacco, petrol and alcohol) were no longer taken into account for benefits and wages.

The mid 1990s also saw the introduction of a new plank in the government strategy to contain non-wage labour costs, namely wage subsidies and reductions of employers' social contributions. These have grown substantially over the following decade: whereas they represented 1,6% of total wage mass in 1996, their share had grown to 4,3% in 2007 (and 4,9% in 2009) (Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven, 2009).

Working time

In the Netherlands, the 'Wassenaar Akkoord' traded wage moderation against large scale reduction of working hours. As Tijdens (2002) points out, working time reduction occurred in different forms over different periods of time. Between 1982 and 1985, it consisted mainly in a reduction of days worked over the course of the year. This policy was scaled back over subsequent years. However, when a new recession hit the Netherlands in 1992, it triggered a second round of 'working time reductions'.

Besides working time reduction, the Wassenaar Akkoord had also foreseen in a second working time measure, that would become one of the defining traits of the Dutch system

over subsequent decades. From the middle of the 1980s the attention focused on part-time work. Social partners adapted their agreements and legislation in order to eliminate clauses that discriminate between full-time and part-time workers. Employers preferred this form of flexibility to outright working time reduction. In a country with a strongly prevalent male breadwinner model, part-time work facilitated entry of women into the labour market, representing a coping strategy to combine family and work. Over subsequent decades, part-time work became the norm rather than the exception for female workers.

The Belgian recovery plans of the 1980s and 1990s also included a number of measures relating to working time reduction: Wage reductions in the early 1980s were accompanied with a reduction in (weekly) working hours. (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996). The recession of the mid 1990s triggered further measures regarding working time reduction. Besides a decrease of weekly working hours, these included measures that effectively shortened the individual career: the age at which early retirement would be granted was lowered to 58 (part-time) and 60 (full-time). Moreover, the right to leave of absence without pay was extended.

In Belgium, part-time work has increased over several decades, but never gained the prominence it has in the Netherlands: Regulation on part-time work remained; by principle (sectoral agreements allow for exceptions) a part-time job should at least represent one third of the full-time working hours.

Income protection and activation

In the Netherlands, the recession years of the 1980s led to very extensive use of disability insurance as a relatively generous and attractive exit route for older workers. As benefit receipt surged, the following decades were marked by a 'battle against disability numbers'. A first wave of measures during the 1980s made benefits less generous (lowering the replacement rates) and less accessible (partially disabled workers could no longer claim full benefits; assessment rules were made more strict). Similar measures followed in the 1990s, with the reassessment of eligibility for young disabled in 1993 and 2004 and the establishment of a link between age of recipient and duration and rate of benefit. Further adaptations were made in 2002 (Gatekeeper Act) and 2006.

Similar strategies were applied to Dutch unemployment insurance: benefits were made both less generous (through a series of non-adaptations of benefits to overall wage developments) and less accessible. In 1987, entitlement criteria for unemployment benefits were made stricter and the duration of the benefit was reduced. Similar measures were taken in 1995. Recipients of the 'last resort safety net' of social assistance were also targeted, particularly from the middle of the 1990s onwards. The Work and Social Assistance Act (2004) instituted controversial work requirements for single parents with children of all ages.

In addition to these measures, a series of special programs geared towards the integration or reintegration of unemployed low-skilled workers were deployed and the public employment service sector was reformed. (Van Oorschot 2006)

While the new activation policy put a strong emphasis on the individual responsibility of benefit recipients, it also focused on the responsibility of employers. Sickness insurance was to a large extent dismantled in 1994. From then on, employers were required to pay wages during sickness leave. This measure aimed at increasing awareness of employers with regard to health and safety. It also reduced opportunities for employers to externalize the costs through social insurance, blocking an entry into disability.

Indeed, the doctrine that 'work is the best social policy' appeared as a leading motive throughout Dutch policy reforms over the course of the previous three decades.

While Belgium has often been portrayed as an archetypal frozen welfare state, Hemerijck and Marx (2010) argue that the country has experienced profound change over the past three decades. Most strikingly, and in contrast to the Dutch success at "activation", the Belgian social insurance state was transformed from a traditional Bismarckian system into one with an overriding emphasis on minimum income protection and universal coverage. This occurred mainly through non-intervention, rather than through policy reform. Living on a benefit became less attractive already from the late 1980s on, because governments "allowed" benefits to erode in value relative to wages and general living standards. Only in 2005, after replacement rates had eroded to a level well below conventional poverty

thresholds, did social partners and government agree on increases beyond the cost of living. (Van Mechelen, Bogaerts, Cantillon, 2007)

Marx (2009) reiterates the point that major changes happened but acknowledges the key criticism that Belgium is finding it very difficult to move away from 'welfare without work'. Spending on active labour market programs (training, job subsidies, social security contributions, public employment programmes), as well on child care, has increased quite substantially, even putting Belgium in the league of the top spenders on such items. Efforts at the demand side have been matched, be it considerably more hesitantly, by social security reform. During the 1990s, there was a wave of unemployment insurance benefit terminations and suspensions on a variety of grounds. Nevertheless, average benefit duration in Belgium remained much higher than in other countries. In 2001, a Work Bonus was introduced for low wage workers to make the move from benefit dependency to low-paid work financially more attractive. But Belgian governments have by and large failed to implement the kind of social security reform needed to create a real pay-off. The 2005 Generation Pact aimed at scaling back early retirement largely failed. Likewise, attempts to tighten entitlements to unemployment benefits have yet to result in a substantial drop in the number of claimants.

2. Outcomes: 1980-2007

The literature currently available – which is mostly qualitative and descriptive - provides very contrasting views on what actually happened in Belgium and the Netherlands separately, and how these developments stack up against each other comparatively. This section of the article takes a resolutely quantitative approach and attempts to gauge the direction, nature and magnitude of change in both countries.

Employment rates

Judging by the standard LFS employment rates, the Dutch employment rate experienced a stellar rise since the early 1980's. In 1983, only half (50,6%) of the working age population (15 to 64) was employed. By 2007, this had increased to three quarter (74,8%). In the most recent years, the Dutch are vying with Scandinavian Members States for the highest

employment rate in the EU. Belgium had a rate similar to the Netherlands in 1983 (53,1%), but its subsequent trajectory pales in comparison (62,0% in 2007).

The graphs below show that the Netherlands now has higher employment rates than Belgium for any age group. The difference is particularly marked among the young and older workers. Employment rates among older workers (aged 55-64) in Belgium are reputedly low. Among older males, employment levels (42,9% in 2007) have slightly increased since the trough of the middle 1990's (32%) but not yet fully recovered to their level of 1983 (47,7%). For older females in Belgium there has been a notable increase, but this is mainly due to a cohort effect (baby boom generation that first entered the labour market is growing older). The Netherlands seem to have been far more successful in promoting employment among older workers, both for males and females.

For the youngest, age group (15-24), the difference between both countries is partly due to a measurement effect related to working time patterns. In the Netherlands, students tend to work for a relatively small number of hours over the course of several months. Belgian students tend to work long hours for a number of weeks mainly during summer (Vandenbrande, 2001). The latter are far less likely to appear in statistics based on the LFS definition, which has a relatively short reference period (one week) and a broad criterion for employment (at least one hour over the course of the reference week).

Figure 1: Employment rate by age, women





Figure 2: Employment rate by age, men



Source: OECD, based on Labour Force Survey

Indeed, a fairly large share of jobs in the Netherlands consists of very few weekly working hours. The Dutch statistical office acknowledges as much by applying a stricter definition of employment, namely at least twelve hours per week. The resulting difference with LFS indicators (one hour criterion) is largest for the young (15-24), a difference of nearly thirty percentage points (40% as compared to 68,2% in 2007). For the population aged 15 to 64, the definitional effect is much larger for women (57% as compared to 68,5%) than for men (75% as compared to 81,0%). (Josten et al., 2009).


Similarly, if we consider full-time equivalents, differences between Belgium and the Netherlands are far less pronounced than judging by the more standard indicators. For the population aged 15-64, the Netherlands (58,6% in 2007) have recently overtaken Belgium (57,7%), but by a small margin. Compared to other European countries, the Dutch look distinctly average (EU27 60,5%). In full-time equivalents, Belgian (47,4%) women work slightly more than their Dutch counterparts (44,4%). (European Commission, 2010) These indicators suggest that the divergence between Belgium and the Netherlands refers not so much to the volume of hours worked, as to the distribution of work across the population.

Unemployment

In addition to early exit from the labour market, (long-term) unemployment remains the Achilles heel of the Belgian labour market. Unemployment has shown typically cyclical fluctuations, but the overall trend up until 2007 has been largely stagnant. Moreover, a sizeable share of the unemployed has been so for over 12 months. This figure is among the highest in the EU of 27 Member States.

Comparison with the Dutch situation is not always straightforward. In the Netherlands, unemployment statistics had become 'suspect' over the course of the 1980s, as labour shedding had to a large extent occurred in disability scheme, a functional equivalent. The Netherlands did however succeed in bringing down both total unemployment and long-term unemployment, to a degree that its headline unemployment rate by 2008 was below the long-term unemployment rate of Belgium. At the same time, one should keep in mind prior observations with regard to employment: to some extent, the denominator (labour force) may have been inflated by a high number of very small jobs.

Figure 3 Unemployment and long-term unemployment as % of the labour force



Source: Eurostat, based on Labour Force Survey

Benefit receipt

Internationally comparable indicators on benefit receipt are few and far between. The data reported in the OECD Employment Outlook 2003 report benefit receipt in full-time


equivalents as percentage of the working age population. These suggest that Belgium and the Netherlands had similar rates of benefit receipt in 1980. By 1990 this rate had increased strongly in Belgium, while the increase in the Netherlands was more modest. Moreover, in the subsequent period to 1999, Belgium only succeeded in a very slight decrease, with the Netherlands being more successful in bringing down its share of benefit recipients.

Table 1 Benefit recipients (full-time equivalent) as percentage of the working age population, total and selected branches.

	Year	Belgium	Netherlands
Total	1980	17,0	16,1
	1990	24,3	20,0
	1999	23,5	17,7
Disability	1980	3,0	6,9
	1990	3,3	7,6
	1999	3,6	7,2
Old age (early retirement)	1980	4,0	0,6
	1990	8,0	0,8
	1999	7,2	0,5
Unemployment	1980	5,4	2,9
	1990	7,3	5,0
	1999	7,0	4,1

National sources confirm this account of benefit receipt in the Netherlands. The combined benefit receipt volumes for unemployment social, social assistance and disability soared between the early 1970's and the middle of the 1980's. In the subsequent decades, unemployment and social assistance stabilized then decreased. The volume of disability claimants had been much more difficult to contain, but started to diminish from 2002 onwards. Over the same period, old age pensions have increased, so that the total volume of benefit claimants has stayed relatively stable. In combination with an increase in the number of workers, Dutch overall dependency ratios have evolved favourably up until 2007.

Figure 4: Netherlands: volume of social security claimants (x1000) (disability+unemployment and assistance, excluding sickness and pensions), 1972-2007



Source:

1972-1997 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (1998), in Visser & Hemerijck (1997);
 1998-2007 Sociale Staat van Nederland (intrapolations for 1999; 2001; 2003)

In Belgium, different benefit provision agencies each collect their own data, which impedes an overview of overall benefit receipt. Nevertheless, even these fragmented data suggest that no similar decrease in benefit receipt has taken place in Belgium. Social assistance claimants (including elderly) increased by 11% between 2003 and 2007, from 118.000 to 127.000². There was over 20% increase of disability claimants between 2000 and 2007, from 200.000 to 242.000. Occupational injuries decreased from 69.000 in 2000 to 61.000 in 2007, but this was clearly insufficient to offset the overall increase in other branches, especially if one takes into account the rising number of pensioners (1,732 million in 2000 to 1,745 million in 2007).

Unemployment insurance continued to contain the bulk of active age benefit claimants. The standard income replacement benefits increased from 650.000 in 2000 to 727.000 in 2006 decrease to 691.000 in 2007. Adding different working time arrangements in the unemployment insurance, the volume increased from 950.000 to 1.208.000 over the same


² POD MI, Jaarlijkse evolutie aantal aantal rechthebbenden leefloon

period. The volumes of basic indemnification of full-time unemployed have fluctuated with economic conditions, but remained stagnant overall. Early retirement and 'older unemployed' have proven very resilient to attempts to reform, reflecting the low employment rates among older workers.

Moreover, unemployment insurance has increasingly taken on new roles, 'supporting' employees. There is the special provision called 'temporary unemployment'. This arrangement provides unemployment benefits to workers --- as a general rule only manual workers --- who are forced to reduce their working time because of factors like bad weather (especially important for construction), technical failures, severe drops in demand and other such external factors theoretically beyond the control of the employer (including strike under certain conditions). The unemployment contract is not terminated, but suspended on a temporary basis (for more details, see Vandaele, 2009). The 'support' category also includes the income of some workers in an activation procedure. F

inally, the National Employment Office provides benefits to employees who (voluntarily) reduce their working time, including career breaks, parental leave. The latter categories have gained considerable importance over the course of the two previous decades. In sum, despite issues of data comparability, it seems safe to conclude that the Netherlands have been more effective than Belgium in reducing benefit receipt on active age.

Figure 5: Belgium: Number of recipients of different forms of unemployment benefits, Belgium



Source: Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening

3. The recent financial and economic crisis: policy response

The policy response of Belgian and Dutch authorities to the recent financial and economic crisis contains echo’s of their prior reform trajectories. A synthetic table shows differences in approach. The Netherlands put a stronger emphasis on training and labour supply measures. For Belgium, the main focus of policy was on labour demand and minimum income protection.

Table 2 Discretionary changes in labour market policy in response to the economic downturn

		<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>
Labour demand			
	Job subsidies, recruitment incentives or public sector job creation	FL, WL	
	Reductions in non-wage labour costs	B	
	Short-time work schemes	B	Y
Measures to help unemployed find work			
	Activation requirements		
	Job search assistance and matching	B, FL, WL	Y
	Job-finding and business start-up incentives	WL	
	Work experience programmes		
	Training programmes	FL	Y
Other training measures			
	Training for existing workers		Y
	Apprenticeship schemes		Y
Income support for job losers and low-income earners			
	Generosity or coverage of unemployment benefits	B	
	Social assistance	B	
	Other payments or in-kind support		
	Fiscal measures for low earners	B	

Source: OECD (2009) "Addressing the labour market challenges of the economic downturn: a summary of responses to the OECD-EC questionnaire".

Labour costs

In a move reminiscent of previous crises, the Dutch social partners, urged on by the Minister for Employment and Social Security agreed on wage restraint³ over the course of 2009 and 2010. Wages could rise at a level comparable to inflation, namely 1%. No new discretionary measures with regard to non-wage labour costs were announced.

³ Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
http://home.szw.nl/index.cfm?menu_item_id=13755&hoofdmenu_item_id=13825&rubriek_item=391841&rubriek_id=391817&set_id=3636&doctype_id=6&link_id=165525

In Belgium, the autonomy of social partners with regard to wage setting remains limited by the 'Competitiveness of Industry Act', which links wage developments in Belgium to those in France, Germany and the Netherlands. The social partners agreed on a 'responsible wage development', consisting of adaptation to cost of living (i.e. respecting the automatic adaptation to cost of living) for gross wages. They added and an extra margin of net wage increases of €125 for 2009 and €250 for 2010, which can take different forms (e.g. ecology vouchers, lunch vouchers and other 'extra-legal' benefits).


In contrast to the Netherlands, Belgium has taken a number of discretionary measures to address non-wage labour costs. These include a simplification and reductions of employers' social contributions. As mentioned before, this has been a staple measure in Belgian labour market policy over the previous decade. Moreover, at the regional level, Flanders increased wage subsidies for employers hiring older workers, while the Walloon region targeted extra wage subsidies towards youth in SME's.

Working time

Similarly to the recessions of the early 1980s and mid 1990s, the Netherlands announced a reduction of working time at the onset of the crisis. The 'werktijdverkorting' is normally restricted to companies facing exceptional circumstances (a fire or a flood). As a crisis measure, it was temporarily extended to companies facing considerable income loss as a result of the crisis. The measure was announced in November 2008, only to be withdrawn (no new applications accepted) in March 2009. It was replaced with a new measure relating to the short-time working scheme, *deeltijd ww*.

The Dutch short-time working scheme' set a number of conditions, making it less generous than many schemes found in other countries. The scheme includes reimbursement obligations for employers that made workers redundant after the period of support. This approach is very much in keeping with the social security reforms, where employers were made financially responsible for sickness pay. Moreover, *deeltijd ww* puts a strong emphasis on skill formation, with a requirement that employees undergo training in the period of non-work.

Figure 6: Annual average stock of employees participating in short-time work schemes as % of all employees



* indicates that data are from national sources; ** indicates that data are OECD estimates using flows data from the OECD-EC questionnaire or from national sources.

a) Countries shown in ascending order of the share of participants in short-time work schemes in 2009.


b) Until 2009 Q3 for Austria and the Netherlands; August 2009 for Portugal and Spain; September 2009 for the Slovak Republic; and October 2009 for Luxembourg and New Zealand.

Source: OECD (2010), *OECD Employment Outlook*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Prior to the crisis, Belgium already had a very sizeable share of the work force (blue collar workers) in short time working schemes (Figure 6). It further developed these in response to the crisis: the temporary unemployment for blue collar workers was extended to some temporary workers. For white collar workers (who are not eligible for temporary unemployment) a distinct but similar scheme was introduced. In contrast to the Netherlands, these (temporary) measures have been widely used. Many commentators have argued that short-time working schemes were key to Belgium’s relatively mild increase in (regular) unemployment over the course of the crisis. In addition, the existing scheme of ‘career breaks’ was augmented with a crisis ‘time credit’, further underlining the proliferation of additional functions to unemployment insurance.

Figure 7. Short-time work schemes helped to preserve permanent jobs in the 2008-09 recession

Proportional and absolute impact on permanent employment due to short-time work schemes from the start of the crisis to 2009 Q3



* indicates countries that introduced a new short-time work scheme in response to the crisis. The estimated jobs impacts refer to period from which the short-time work scheme became operational until the end of 2009 Q3.

a) The proportional impact of the crisis due to short-time working is calculated by multiplying the coefficient on the interaction term of the change in output, the crisis dummy and average take-up rate in Panel A of Table 1.4 by the total change in output and the average national take-up rate during the crisis period.

b) The absolute number of jobs saved due to short-time working is calculated by multiplying the proportional impact of the crisis due to short-time working by the level of permanent employment at the onset of the crisis.

Source: OECD's calculations based on Panel A of Table 1.4.

In response to the crisis, the Dutch cabinet confirmed its commitment to the goal of higher labour participation, excluding any measures aiming to reduce labour supply as counterproductive over the longer term. The financial and economic crisis has caused considerable concerns over the sustainability of the pension system, as many of the pension funds have been badly affected. In view of sustainability of pensions and public finances, the

cabinet urged the social partners to reach an agreement on an increase of the pension age from 65 to 67. They did so in the summer of 2010.⁴

The Belgian response to the crisis is in stark contrast with the Dutch measures. While an increase in the pension age had been proposed by some parties, the competent Minister claimed that this was not the main priority within the Belgian context. As he argued, the strong prevalence of early retirement means that few employees work until the current pension age of 65. Rather than increasing this statutory age, the priority would be to scale back entry into early retirement. In spite of these policy orientations, early retirement has continued to play a major role during the crisis. In a number of highly mediatised cases, it has been granted from age 50 (Opel) or 52 (Carrefour). The current crisis did not lead to path-breaking practices in this respect.

Job search assistance and training

Many of the measures of the Dutch authorities were geared towards better job search assistance and matching. These included⁵ the introduction of ‘mobility centres’ for regions that were particularly hit by mass lay-offs. Social partners, educational institutions and job centres cooperate to facilitate information flows on unemployment and vacancies. Furthermore, education and training are key elements of the Dutch strategy. Measures were mainly aimed at stimulating employers to invest in training of their staff. These include grants for retraining workers that are facing redundancy; an increase in tax credit for employers to compensate for training costs for existing workers; reimbursement of training costs for employers taking on board new unskilled workers for accreditation programme. For the young, a special action plan was developed, aiming to temporarily delay entry in the labour market. It furthermore instituted guaranteed traineeship for all school leavers that have been unemployed for over three months.

⁴ Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

http://home.szw.nl/index.cfm?menu_item_id=13755&hoofdmenu_item_id=13825&rubriek_item=391841&rubriek_id=391817&set_id=3636&doctype_id=6&link_id=165525

⁵ Based on “Addressing the labour market challenges of the economic downturn: a summary of responses to the OECD-EC questionnaire”.

Similarly to the Netherlands and many other countries, Belgium and its regions made extra efforts with regard to job search assistance and counselling. All firms of 20 workers or more with massive lay-offs were required to set up cells for 'outplacement' for all of their workers, (this measure formerly only applied to older workers). At the regional level, Flanders and Wallonia took measures for temporary workers: extra staffing of Public Employment Services (Flanders) and extension of job search support (Wallonia). Wallonia introduced new payments to cover child care and travel costs for job seeker who take up low paid work. Flanders, in a move reminiscent of the Dutch approach, increased access to training programs for the unemployed. Belgium did not however grant financial support for employers retraining their staff, as was the case in the Netherlands.

Income support

In the Netherlands, the cabinet agreed to link the evolution of social benefits to wages. On the one hand, this entails moderation of social benefits, given the context of wage restraint. On the other hand, it could be considered a trend break, compared to benefit freezes and reductions that had occurred during previous recessions. In the current context of favourable ratios between benefit recipients and workers (the so-called inactive/active) rate, the authorities steered clear of such austerity measures⁶


Belgium has taken a range of measures with regard to income support, in addition to the automatic adaptation to cost of living. There were increases in replacement rates for the unemployed, for social assistance payments, the compensation of short time workers and the tax credit for low wage workers. These could be considered a break with the trend of previous decades, which had been erosion of protection of minimum incomes 'by stealth' (unannounced, through adaptation to the cost of living, but not to living standards) (Van Mechelen, Bogaerts, Cantillon, 2007). However, it is not entirely clear to what extent the increases can be considered as crisis measures. Even if they have been announced as such, a number of increases had been agreed, even applied well before the crisis, as part of the 2005 Generation Pact.

⁶ Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
http://home.szw.nl/index.cfm?menu_item_id=13755&hoofdmenu_item_id=13825&rubriek_item=391841&rubriek_id=391817&set_id=3636&doctype_id=6&link_id=165525

4. The empirical account: 2007-2010


Throughout the economic and financial crisis, the Netherlands and Belgium have both been cited among countries where the impact on employment and unemployment rates has been relatively mild. Both countries seem to have weathered the storm well, compared to Spain, but also countries with allegedly flexible labour markets (the USA or Ireland). In the Belgium, short time working schemes are considered the main reason for this success. Dutch sources cite a number of reasons for their favorable outcomes. Some consider that the tight labour market of previous years and prospects for coming years have motivated Dutch employers to hold on to staff. Moreover, delayed entry on the labour market for the young, and non-eligibility to benefits self-employed without staff would seem to have played a role.

Employment rate, men and women aged 15-64







Source: Eurostat, based on Labour Force Survey

Unemployment rate, men and women aged 15-64





With regard to benefit receipt, the Dutch volume of recipients has increased quite substantially in social assistance and the unemployment insurance (including deeltijd ww, even if the system has not been widely used). These increases are partly offset by a continued decrease within the branch of disability. As a result, the number of (active age) benefit recipients at the end of 2009 is broadly comparable to early 2007.







Source: Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek

For Belgium, the number of recipients of 'regular' full-time unemployment benefits has remained stable throughout the crisis. Measures relating to working time adjustment have increased, but not remarkably beyond their trend level of previous years. The bulk of the impact was clearly borne in the measures of 'supported employees', most prominently the short-time working scheme. Nevertheless, the continued use of early retirement as a tool for labour shedding is worrying. Moreover, an increase in social assistance receipt, well beyond the trend of previous years, raises concern.





Source: Rijkdienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling



Source: POD Maatschappelijke Integratie

Conclusion

Belgium and the Netherlands, countries of similar size, sharing many institutional characteristics, have diverged considerably since the early 1980s. The Netherlands have often been lauded for their 'miraculous' transformation from welfare without work to a new model with high (flexible) employment. With regard to employment, this account should be somewhat nuanced because of high reliance on part-time unemployment and small jobs, particularly among the young. Nevertheless, the Dutch seem to have succeeded in promoting and 'generalising' employment, with strong reductions of benefit receipt.

Belgium, by contrast, is often considered the typical frozen welfare state, unable to escape the double bind of welfare without work. As we argued in this paper, this account underestimates Belgium to a certain extent. Employment rates for prime age workers are close to those in the Netherlands. The welfare state has undergone a number of transformations, even if these were less visible than the reforms in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the country continues to struggle with long-term unemployment and has found itself unable to halt the ongoing process of labour shedding among older workers.

Compared to previous crises, both countries have shown a degree of continuity in their policy responses, but also a number of differences. The Netherlands reinstated two of its tried and tested methods: wage moderation and working time reduction. The latter measure was abolished quite quickly however, only to be replaced by a short-time working scheme that played a marginal role. Whereas in previous crises, access to and generosity of active age benefits had been reduced significantly, no such moves have taken place in this round. Rather, the focus shifted to pensions, where the crisis has triggered an agreement to increase the statutory pension age.

Belgium has in many respects continued along the path it had followed over the previous decade: wage restraint ('imposed' by evolutions in neighbouring countries) and the reduction of employers' social contributions (in addition to wage restraint) are hardly innovative within a Belgian context. One might argue that a break with the past has been made by increasing income support for workers, even if this policy had predated the crisis. The most mediated measure has been an extension of existing short-time working schemes,

which seems to have been successful in halting an increase in unemployment. It attracted considerable attention from abroad, and could indeed be considered as evidence of a shift towards 'welfare with work'. With regard to older workers, one of the main weaknesses of the Belgian labour market, however, no path-breaking trends are evident. Inflow into early retirement schemes continues as before.

Bibliography

Aarts, L., and P. de Jong (1996), eds. *Curing the Dutch Disease*. Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury;

Andries, M. (1996), 'The Politics of Targeting: the Belgian Case', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 6 (3) 209-233;

Atkinson, A., L. Rainwater and T. Smeeding (1995), *Income Distribution in OECD Countries*. Paris: OECD;

Becker, U. (2001), "Miracle by Consensus? Consensualism and Dominance in Dutch Employment Development." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 22: 453-483;

Cantillon, B., J. Peeters and E. De Ridder (1987), *Atlas van de Sociale Zekerheid in België*. Leuven: Acco;

Cantillon, B. (1993), 'De beperkingen van de sociale zekerheid', *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid*, 35 (1) 3-43;

Cantillon, B., Marx, I., and V. De Maesschalck (2003), "Le trilemme de la sécurité sociale: passé, futur et present; La protection minimale de l'état providence," *Revue Belge de Sécurité Sociale*, 2^e trimestre, p. 397-435;

Cantillon, B., Van Mechelen, N., Marx, I., Van den Bosch, K. (2004), 'L'Evolution de la protection minimale dans les états-Providence au cours des années '90: 15 Pays Européens', *Revue Belge de Sécurité Sociale*, 3^{de} trimestre, p. 513-549 ;

Cassiers, I., P. De Villé and P. Solar (1996), 'Economic Growth in Post-War Belgium', in: N. Crafts and G. Tonioli (eds.), *Economic Growth in Europe since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven (2009) Technisch verslag van het Secretariaat over de maximale beschikbare marges voor de loonkostontwikkeling. Brussel: Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven.

Cox, R.H. (2008). How Globalization and the European Union are Changing European Welfare States. Paper presented at the conference "Social Policy in the New Europe: The Experience of Austria and the Smaller EU States," Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 27-28 March 2008.

- De Lathouwer, L. (1997), 'Twintig jaar beleidsontwikkelingen in de Belgische Werkloosheidsverzekering', *Belgisch tijdschrift voor sociale zekerheid*, 39 (3-4) 817-879;
- De Lathouwer, L. (2001), 'Les pièges à l'emploi en Belgique: diagnostic et options politiques', *Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles*, 171, 41-70 ;
- Deleeck, H. (2001), *De architectuur van de welvaartsstaat opnieuw bekeken*. Leuven: Acco;
- Ebbinghaus, B. (2000), "Any Way Out of 'Exit from Work'? Reversing the Entrenched Pathways of Early Retirement." In *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy*. Vol. II: *Diverse Responses to Common Challenges*. Eds. Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien Schmidt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000;
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1996), 'Welfare States without Work: the Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy', in: G. Esping-Andersen (ed.), *Welfare States in Transition; National Adaptations in Global Economies*. London: Sage;
- Esping-Andersen, G., D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck and J. Myles (2002), *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press;
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1996), "Welfare States without Work: The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy." In *Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies*. Ed. *idem*. London: Sage;
- Esping Andersen, G. (1999), *Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economies*. Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- European Commission. (2010). Compendium of indicators for monitoring the Employment Guidelines and employment analysis. July 2010 version.
- Fajertag, G., and P. Pochet (2000), eds. *Social Pacts in Europe*. Brussels: ETUI;
- Ferrera, M., A. Hemerijck, and M. Rhodes (2000), *The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy*. Oeiras: Celta Editoria, 2000;
- Ferrera, M. and A. Hemerijck (2003), 'Recalibrating Europe's welfare regimes', in in J. Zeitlin D.M. Trubek (eds.), *Governing Work and Welfare in the New Economy. European and American Experiments*, Oxford: Oxford University Press;
- Hartog, J. (1999), *Country Employment Policy Review: The Netherlands*. Report for symposium on "Social Dialogue and Employment Success." Geneva: ILO;

- Hemerijck, A. (1995), "Corporatist Immobility in the Netherlands." In *Organized Industrial Relations in Europe: What Future?* Eds. Colin Crouch and Franz Traxler. Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury;
- Hemerijck, A. (1992), "The Historical Contingencies of Dutch Corporatism." Ph.D. diss., Balliol College, Oxford University;
- Hemerijck, A., and P. Manow (2001), "The Experience of Negotiated Reforms in the Dutch and German Welfare States." In *Comparing Welfare Capitalism, Social Policy and Political Economy in Europe, Japan, and the USA*. Eds. B. Ebbinghaus and P. Manow. London: Routledge;
- Hemerijck, A., M. van de Meer, and J. Visser (2001), "Innovation through Co-ordination: Two Decades of Social Pacts in the Netherlands." In *Social Pacts in Europe: New Dynamics*. Eds. Giuseppe Fajertag and Philippe Pochet. Brussels: ETUI;
- Hemerijck, A., and J. Visser (1999), "The Dutch Model: An Obvious Candidate for the Third Way?" In *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* I, Vol. XL: 102-121;
- Hemerijck, A. (2002), 'The Self-Transformation of the European Social Model(s), in G. Esping-Andersen, Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. and J. Myles, *Why we Need a New Welfare State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press;
- Hemerijck, A. (2006), 'Social Change and Welfare Reform', in: A. Giddens, P. Diamond and R. Liddle (eds.). *Global Europe, Social Europe*, Polity Press, Cambridge;
- Hemerijck, A and M. Schludi (2000) 'Sequences of Policy Failures and Effective Policy Responses', in F. W. Scharpf and V. Schmidt (eds), *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy – From Vulnerability to Competitiveness*, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Hemerijck, A., Unger, B. and Visser, J. (2000), How Small Countries Negotiate Change: Twenty-Five Years of Policy Adjustment in Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, in F.W. Scharpf and V. Schmidt (eds.), *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy –Diverse Responses to Common Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press;
- Hemerijck, A. and I. Marx (2010), Recalibrating Continental Welfare in Belgium and the Netherlands, forthcoming in Palier, B. (ed.), *The Politics of Reform in Continental Welfare Systems*. Amsterdam University Press/ Chicago University Press
- Kersbergen, Kees van (1995), *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*. London: Routledge;
- Knijff, T. and M. Kremer (1997), Gender and the Caring Dimension of Welfare States: Towards Inclusive Citizenship, in *Social Politics* 4(3): 328-361;
- Kok, W. et al. (2003), *Jobs, Jobs, Jobs - Creating More Employment in Europe*, Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, Brussels: European Communities;

- Kuipers, S. (2006), *The Crisis Imperative. Crisis Rhetoric and Welfare State Reform in Belgium and the Netherlands in the early 1990s*, Amsterdam : Amsterdam University Press;
- Leonard, J and M. Van Audenrode (1993), « Corporatism Run Amok, Job Stability and Industrial Policy in Belgium and the United States », in *Economic Policy* Vol 8 : 355-400;
- Marx, I. and Verbist, G. (1998), 'Low-paid work and poverty: a cross-country perspective', in Bazen, S., Gregory, M. and W. Salverda (eds.), *Low-wage employment in Europe*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar;
- Marx, I. (2001), "Job subsidies and cuts in employers' social security contributions: The verdict of empirical evaluation studies", in *International Labour Review*, 140 (1): 69-85;
- Marx, I. (2007), *A New Social Question ? On Minimum Income Protection in the Postindustrial Era*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press;
- Marx, I. (2007b), "The Dutch Miracle Revisited: The Impact of Employment Growth on Poverty", in *Journal of Social Policy*;
- Marx, I. (2009): 'Belgium: a post-Bismarckian welfare state looking for a way out of 'welfare without work' , in Schubert et al., *European Welfare Systems*; New York: Routledge
- Marx, I. and G. Verbist (2008), 'When familism fails: the nature and causes of in-work poverty in Belgium', in in H.J. Andrez and H. Lohmann, *The Working Poor in Europe; Employment, Poverty and Globalization*, London: Edward Elgar.
- OECD (2003), *Employment Outlook*. Paris: OECD;
- Peeters, H. and H. Larmuseau (2005), 'De solidariteit van de gelijkgestelde periodes – een exploratie naar de aard, het belang en de zin van de gelijkgestelde periodes in de totale pensioenopbouw bij werknemers'. , *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid*, 2005-1;
- Pierson, P. (1996), 'The New Politics of the Welfare State', *World Politics*, 48, 143-179;
- Pierson, P. (1998), 'Irristesistible Forces, Immovable Objects: Post-industrial Welfare States confront Permanent Austerity', in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5 (4) : 539-60;
- Pierson, P. (ed.) (2001), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Riel, B. van, A. Hemerijck, and J. Visser (2003). "Is There a Dutch Way to Pension Reform?" In *Pensions in the 21st Century: Re-drawing the Public-Private Divide*. Eds. G. Clark and N. Whiteside. Oxford: Oxford University Press;

- Scharpf, F.W./Schmidt, V.A. (eds.) (2000), *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy*, 2 Volumes, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Schmid, G. (1996), "The Dutch Employment Miracle? A Comparison of Employment Systems in the Netherlands and Germany." Discussion Paper FS 96-206, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung;
- Schokkaert, E., M. Verhue and G. Pepermans (2000), 'Vlamingen over het pensioensysteem', in: P. Pestieau, L. Gevers, V. Ginsburgh, E. Schokkaert and B. Cantillon (eds.), *De toekomst van onze pensioenen*. pp. 55-75. Leuven: Garant;
- Josten, E., van Echtelt, P., Wildeboer Schut, J-M. en Vrooman, C. (2009). *Inkomen en Werk*. In: R. Bijl, J. Boelhouwer, E. Pommer and P. Schyns (eds.) *Sociale staat van Nederland 2009*. Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
- Spies, H., and Berkel, R. van (2000), "Workfare in the Netherlands—Young Unemployed People and the Jobseeker's Employment Act." In *'An Offer You Can't Refuse': Workfare in International Perspective*. Eds. I. Lødemel and H. Trickey. Bristol: Policy Press;
- Thelen, K.A. (1999), 'historical institutionalism in comparative politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 369-404;
- Thelen, K. A. (2002), 'How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis', in: J. Mahoney and D. Reuschemeyer (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;
- Thelen, K.A. (2004), *How Institutions Evolve. The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;
- Tijdens, K. (2002). Arbeidsduurverkorting en het Akkoord van Wassenaar. Via deeltijdarbeid en verlofsparen naar CAO à la carte. In: Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken 18 (4) 309-320.
- Toren, J.P. van (1996), *Achter Gesloten Deuren? CAO-overleg in de Jaren Negentig*. Amsterdam: Welboom;
- Vandenbrande, T. (2001), Hoofdstuk 11. Studenten en werk. In: Steunpunt Werkgelegenheid, Arbeid en Vorming. *De arbeidsmarkt in Vlaanderen. Jaarboek 2001*, Leuven: Steunpunt Werkgelegenheid, Arbeid en Vorming
- Vandenbroucke, F. (2001), 'The Active Welfare State: a social-democratic ambition for Europe', *Policy Network Journal*, 1;
- Van Oorschot, W. (2006). The Dutch Welfare State: Recent trends and challenges in historical perspective. In: *European Journal of Social Security* 8(1) 57-76.

- Van Ruysseveldt, J. en Visser, J. (1996) 'Weak Corporatism Going Different Ways? Industrial Relations in the Netherlands and Belgium', in Joris Van Ruysseveldt and Jelle Visser (eds.), *Industrial Relations in Europe: Traditions and Transitions*. London: Sage, 205-264;
- Veen, R. van der, and W. Trommel (1999), "Managed Liberalization of the Dutch Welfare State." *Governance* 12, no. 3;
- Verhue, M., E. Schokkaert, and E. Omeij (1997), De kloof tussen laag- en hoggeschoolden en de politieke houdbaarheid van de Belgische werkloosheidsverzekering: een empirische analyse., Universiteit Gent (Fac. Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen) Working Paper 36;
- Vilrocx, J. and Van Leemput, J. (1997), 'Belgium: The Great Transformation', in Ferner, A. and Hyman, R. (eds.), *Changing Industrial Relations in Europe.*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 315-347;
- Visser, J. (1999), The First Part-time Economy in the World: Does it Work?" AIAS-CESAR Research Paper, Amsterdam;
- Visser, J., and A. Hemerijck. "A Dutch Miracle": Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997;
- Windmuller, J. P. (1969), *Labor Relations in the Netherlands*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press;
- Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) (1990), *Een Werkend Perspectief. Arbeidsparticipatie in de Jaren '90*. Reports to the Government 38, The Hague, SDU;
- WRR (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government) (2006), *De Verzorgingsstaat Herwogen: Over Verzorgen, Verzekeren, Verheffen en Verbinden*, Report to the Government no. 76, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press;
- WRR (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government) (2007), *Investeren in Werkzekerheid*, Report to the Government no. 77, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press;